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For nearly a quarter-century, federal courts have deferred to administrative 
agencies’ statutory interpretations under the renowned Chevron doctrine.  
Despite Chevron’s widespread appeal, its theoretical foundations remain 
contested.  Judges and academics have debated whether Chevron rests on a 
theory of congressional delegation, administrative expertise, the executive 
branch’s political responsiveness and accountability, agency deliberative 
rationality, concerns for national regulatory uniformity, or inherent executive 
power.  This Article challenges the terms of this longstanding debate by 
demonstrating that Chevron does not rest exclusively upon any of these 
competing rationales.  Instead, Chevron forges a pragmatic consensus between 
several leading theories, none of which can be properly considered redundant.  
By embracing pluralism and practical wisdom in statutory interpretation, 
Chevron furnishes an enduring response to the fragmentation of contemporary 
legal and political theory. 
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court appeared to abandon 
Chevron’s consensus by endorsing congressional delegation as the touchstone 
for Chevron deference.  By all accounts, Mead has sown confusion and discord 
in the circuit courts.  What Mead’s critics have failed to appreciate, however, 
is that the Supreme Court actually employs the congressional delegation 
theory instrumentally to sustain Chevron’s consensus: where agency decision-
making processes satisfy all of the leading rationales for deference, the Court 
applies Chevron.  Conversely, where any of the leading rationales for 
deference remains unsatisfied, the Court evaluates agency statutory 
interpretations under the residual Skidmore test. 
The time has come to dismantle Mead’s delegation fiction and expressly 
reconstruct Chevron’s pluralist consensus as the definitive test for Chevron 
deference.  By candidly reaffirming Chevron’s consensus, the Supreme Court 
would clarify the scope of Chevron’s domain and enhance judicial 
transparency and accountability in statutory interpretation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly a quarter-century has passed since the Supreme Court decided 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., holding that 
federal courts must defer to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations 
of ambiguous statutes.1  Although Chevron has since become “the most cited 
case in modern public law,”2 its theoretical underpinnings remain uncertain.  
 
1 Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
2 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006); see also STEPHEN 
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 289 
(5th ed. 2002) (observing that Chevron has been cited more times than Brown v. Board of 
Education, Roe v. Wade, and Marbury v. Madison combined). 
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Scholars have debated whether Chevron deference rests upon a theory of 
congressional delegation, administrative expertise, agency deliberative 
rationality, the executive branch’s political responsiveness and accountability, 
concerns for national regulatory uniformity, or inherent executive power.3  The 
contest between these competing foundational theories for Chevron deference 
reflects longstanding divisions over the proper relationship between agencies, 
courts, Congress, and the Chief Executive in the administrative state. 
While scholars continue to ponder whether congressional delegation, agency 
expertise, or another comprehensive theory constitutes Chevron’s optimal 
foundation, this Article offers a different perspective.  Returning to the text of 
Justice Stevens’s unanimous opinion, I argue that Chevron does not rest 
exclusively on any single comprehensive theory of court-agency relations.  
Although the Chevron decision pays its respects to several of the grand 
theoretical movements of its era – legal realism, civic republicanism, 
neopluralism, public choice theory, and unitary executive theory – it makes no 
effort to arbitrate between these movements or their respective visions of 
statutory interpretation.  Instead, Chevron’s methodology is pluralistic and 
conciliatory: courts should defer to the EPA’s reasonable interpretations of the 
Clean Air Act precisely because all the leading theories of the administrative 
state support deference to agencies under the circumstances presented. 
The genius of Justice Stevens’s Chevron opinion is its insight that jurists 
who espouse fundamentally different views regarding the relationship between 
courts and administrative agencies in our federal system could still endorse 
judicial deference to the EPA under the circumstances presented in Chevron.  
A decade earlier, political philosopher John Rawls had proposed that pluralistic 
societies could achieve greater political stability and social cohesion by forging 
an “overlapping consensus” between competing comprehensive theories of 
“justice” based on citizens’ shared conception of “justice as fairness.”4  Cass 
 
3 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 
YALE L.J. 2280, 2297-2301 (2006) (inherent executive power); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of 
Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002) (administrative expertise); Thomas W. 
Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) 
(congressional delegation); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing 
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
83, 87 (1994) (agency deliberative rationality); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases 
per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review 
of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred 
Fifty Cases] (concerns for national regulatory uniformity); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2587 (2006) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury] (the executive branch’s political responsiveness and 
accountability). 
4 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3, 340, 508-10 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE].  See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping 
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Sunstein would later build upon Rawls’s insight, arguing that judges should 
seek consensus on the outcome of particular cases even when they 
fundamentally disagree about the higher-level theory that justifies the shared 
result.5  In a similar spirit, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the unanimous Court 
in Chevron frames the EPA’s decision-making process as a locus of theoretical 
consensus between the leading rationales for deference, endowing Chevron 
deference with an uncommon degree of political stability.6  That Chevron has 
become the preeminent authority in American statutory interpretation is a 
testament to the durability of its consensus.7 
Although Chevron enjoys widespread acceptance today, its pluralist 
consensus has been misunderstood and its early promise has not been fully 
realized.  In 2001, the Supreme Court undermined Chevron’s consensus in 
United States v. Mead Corp. by expressly grounding Chevron in the 
congressional delegation theory.8  Rather than confine Chevron’s application 
to contexts where all the leading rationales support deference to agency 
statutory interpretations, the Court held that Chevron applies whenever a court 
concludes Congress has authorized an agency to promulgate statutory 
interpretations “with the force of law.”9  Predictably, the Court’s turn to 
Mead’s delegation fiction has proven to be highly controversial.  Proponents of 
other rationales for Chevron deference have decried Mead’s delegation inquiry 
as an indeterminate legal fiction,10 and circuit courts have struggled to apply 
 
Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233 (1989) [hereinafter Rawls, Domain].  This Article does 
not defend Rawls’s vision of liberal political legitimacy per se, nor does it aspire to establish 
the political legitimacy of Chevron’s revolution from the perspective of Rawlsian political 
liberalism or any other comprehensive theory. 
5 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-38 (1996) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING]. 
6 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839 (1984). 
7 Chevron’s consensus differs from Rawls’s paradigmatic “overlapping consensus” 
inasmuch as Chevron’s domain is defined by agency decision-making processes rather than 
an abstract political conception of the public good.  As will be shown in Part II, however, 
Chevron also transcends Sunstein’s paradigmatic “incompletely theorized agreement” 
because the Supreme Court has implicitly embraced several discrete rationales within 
Chevron’s consensus as trans-procedural requirements for Chevron deference.  Rather than 
attempt to define and defend a third modality of pragmatic consensus in contradistinction to 
Rawls and Sunstein, I will simply refer to Chevron’s overlapping rationales throughout this 
Article as “Chevron’s consensus.” 
8 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 
9 Id. at 229. 
10 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1475 (2005) [hereinafter Bressman, How Mead Has 
Muddled]; Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 771, 792 (2002); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2603 (“In Mead and 
similar cases, why is the refusal to defer to the executive the most sensible fiction, that is, 
the most reasonable instruction to attribute to Congress?”). 
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the Supreme Court’s new test in a principled, consistent manner.  It might be 
tempting to conclude, therefore, that Chevron has drifted far from the moorings 
of its original consensus. 
Appearances can be deceiving, however.  Even after Mead, the Supreme 
Court continues to apply Chevron deference only in contexts that fall within 
the scope of Chevron’s original consensus.  Under the pretext of reconstructing 
Congress’s intent, the Court has granted Chevron deference where agency 
decision-making processes satisfy five core factors: (1) congressionally 
delegated authority, (2) agency expertise, (3) political responsiveness and 
accountability, (4) deliberative rationality, and (5) national uniformity.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, none of these overlapping rationales can be 
properly considered redundant; since the Court decided Mead, it has 
consistently withheld Chevron deference when any one of these core rationales 
is not satisfied.11  Thus, the Supreme Court continues to honor Chevron’s 
consensus under the veil of Mead’s delegation fiction. 
To reap the full benefits of Chevron’s pluralist vision, the Supreme Court 
should pierce Mead’s delegation fiction and reaffirm Chevron’s consensus as 
the definitive test for determining the scope of Chevron’s domain.  By 
reconstructing Chevron’s consensus, the Court would defuse much of the 
criticism that has been directed against Mead’s polarizing delegation fiction.  
More importantly, a consensus-based approach would illuminate the 
boundaries of Chevron’s domain, giving circuit courts a more coherent and 
intelligible framework for mapping Chevron’s domain.  Under the consensus-
based approach, federal courts would grant Chevron deference only in contexts 
where an agency’s decision-making process satisfies the five leading rationales 
for deference.  Conversely, where agency statutory interpretations do not 
satisfy one or more of these factors, federal courts would bypass Chevron and 
consider instead whether deference is warranted under Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co.,12 a flexible multifactor test that has resurfaced in Mead’s wake.13  
Chevron’s consensus therefore has a vital role to play in clarifying the 
respective domains of courts and agencies in statutory interpretation. 
I. CONSTRUCTING CHEVRON’S CONSENSUS 
Chevron’s basic facts and holding rank among the most oft-recited in 
American law.14  The conventional narrative is familiar territory for students of 
administrative law and therefore can be summarized succinctly. 
 
11 See infra Part II.C. 
12 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
13 See id. at 140 (evaluating whether an agency statutory interpretation merits deference 
based upon “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 
to persuade, if lacking power to control”). 
14 See BREYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 289. 
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In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require any company 
creating a significant new “stationary source” of air pollutants to undergo an 
extensive regulatory review process.  Four years later, the EPA interpreted the 
term “stationary source” to refer to an emitting plant as a whole rather than the 
plant’s constituent parts.  This holistic approach to emissions regulation – 
known popularly as the “bubble concept” – gave plant management the 
flexibility to modify equipment without triggering new source review so long 
as the modifications, taken as a whole, did not generate a substantial negative 
impact upon the plant’s overall emissions.15  When the Natural Resources 
Defense Council appealed the EPA’s new interpretation, the D.C. Circuit 
struck down the agency’s rule as an impermissible construction of the Act.16  
The Supreme Court disagreed.  In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice 
Stevens, the Court stated that federal courts must apply a two-step test when 
reviewing statutes under agency administration: first, if “Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue” and “the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter”; and second, “[i]f . . . the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue” because “the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court must 
determine whether the agency’s construction of the statute is reasonable.17  
Applying this two-step test to the case at hand, the Court held that the D.C. 
Circuit erred in declining to defer to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the 
Act.18 
Justice Stevens offered several reasons why the D.C. Circuit should have 
deferred to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the term “stationary source.”  
First, he explained that the 1977 Amendments could be construed to reflect an 
implicit delegation of policymaking authority from Congress to the EPA: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation. . . .  Sometimes the legislative 
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than 
explicit.  In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of 
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.19 
Second, courts should defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes, Justice Stevens argued, because agencies have experience 
and expertise that is valuable in accommodating “manifestly competing 
interests” – particularly in contexts where “the regulatory scheme is technical 
 
15 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 384-85 
(4th ed. 2004). 
16 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 
rev’d, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
17 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
18 Id. at 844. 
19 Id. at 843-44. 
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and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned 
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”20  Third, 
Justice Stevens suggested that administrative agencies might “properly” 
resolve the policy questions implicit in ambiguous statutes by “rely[ing] upon 
the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices . . . .”21  Each of these theories – congressional 
delegation, agency expertise, and executive accountability – as well as a 
variety of others counseled deference to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of 
the Clean Air Act. 
A. The Chevron Revolution: Separating Fact from Fiction 
The Chevron decision cast a long shadow over federal statutory 
interpretation.  Chevron has been hailed “as a kind of revolution[,] . . . not only 
as a counter-Marbury for the modern era but also as a kind of McCulloch v. 
Maryland, granting the executive broad discretion to choose its own preferred 
means to promote statutory ends.”22  Some scholars have argued that Chevron 
fundamentally altered the division of labor between courts and agencies in 
statutory interpretation.23  Others have viewed Chevron as the starting point for 
an even more ambitious project: renegotiating the relationship between courts 
and the executive branch across the vast expanse of public law, from criminal 
prosecution24 to foreign affairs.25  It may be worth stepping back for a moment, 
 
20 Id. at 865 (citations omitted). 
21 Id. 
22 Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2596 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 976 (1992) (“Justice Stevens’s opinion contained several 
features that can only be described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at 
the time.” (citation omitted)). 
23 See, e.g., Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in 
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2006); John S. Kane, Refining Chevron – 
Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 532 n.102 
(2008). 
24 See, e.g., Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that Chevron deference should not be subject to proposed 
exceptions for the strict interpretation of criminal and deportation statutes); Dan M. Kahan, 
Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 469 (1996). 
25 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 
649, 651 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1170 (2007) (arguing that the impact of Chevron on executive power 
has “many implications for legal issues raised by the war on terror, including those explored 
in the Hamdi and Hamdan cases”); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2663-64 (2005).  But see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, 
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therefore, to distinguish the features of Justice Stevens’s opinion that were 
truly revolutionary from those that merely synthesized, well-established 
principles. 
1. The Chevron Two-Step 
As important as Chevron has become to American statutory interpretation 
over the last two decades, in many significant respects its innovations were 
more “evolutionary” than “revolutionary.”26  For decades prior to Chevron, 
federal courts had preached deference to administrative agencies in statutory 
interpretation.  The instruction that courts should honor Congress’s 
“unambiguously” expressed intent at Step One followed a long line of 
decisions preaching that courts must apply clear statutory instructions.27  By 
the same token, Chevron’s assertion that courts should defer to agencies’ 
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes at Step Two merely clarified 
the Court’s prior jurisprudence.  For fifty years, the Supreme Court had 
stressed that lower courts should defer to agencies where ambiguous statutory 
provisions could support multiple plausible constructions.28 
This view of Chevron’s two-step formula as a mere synthesis and 
refinement of the Supreme Court’s prior jurisprudence has become the 
“general consensus” among scholars, and for good reason.29  The opinion itself 
does not proclaim any revolutionary purpose, nor does it purport to overrule, or 
 
Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1230 (2007) (disputing 
Chevron’s applicability to foreign relations law generally); Evan Criddle, Comment, 
Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927-28 (2003) 
(disputing Chevron’s applicability to treaty interpretation). 
26 Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
284 (1986) (characterizing Chevron as evolutionary since it only “remind[ed] lower federal 
courts of their obligation to defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of any statutes 
administered by that agency”).  See Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 
MO. L. REV. 129, 131 (1993) (arguing that “Chevron’s importance has been exaggerated”). 
27 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); 
see, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) 
(observing that courts “must reject administrative constructions of the statute . . . that are 
inconsistent with the statutory mandate”); Office Employees Int’l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 
313, 318-19 (1957) (rejecting an agency statutory interpretation based on “the clear 
expression of the Congress to the contrary”). 
28 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11; Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 
42-43 (inferring from “the absence of a prohibition on the agency arrangements at issue” 
and “the lack of a clearly enunciated legislative purpose to that effect” that the FEC’s 
statutory interpretation was not “contrary to law”); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (stating 
that the task of interpreting the term “employee” in the National Labor Relations Act “has 
been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act” and must 
be affirmed “if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law”). 
29 Hickman, supra note 23, at 1578. 
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even criticize, any earlier case.30  Instead, it emphasizes continuity with prior 
decisions and bolsters each step with lengthy string citations to supporting 
precedents.31  Chevron’s two-step formula apparently was not a source of 
contention among the Justices; no concurring or dissenting opinions 
accompanied the decision,32 and the best available evidence suggests that it 
was not even discussed during the Court’s internal deliberations.33  Thus, there 
is little reason to believe the Supreme Court envisioned Chevron’s two-step 
formula as anything more than a modest restatement of the Court’s deference 
doctrines.34 
2. Flexible Agency Administration 
In another respect, however, Chevron did spark a genuine revolution – by 
challenging the reigning principles of certainty and finality in statutory 
interpretation.  Under certain circumstances, the Court declared, ambiguous 
regulatory statutes need not be ascribed a fixed and final meaning, whether by 
courts or agencies; rather, their meaning should be allowed to fluctuate over 
time to facilitate agency policy experimentation.35  In Chevron’s brave new 
world, neither courts nor agencies would have to bind themselves to a 
particular interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.  Instead, courts 
would construe statutory ambiguity as a discretionary space for what I will call 
“flexible agency administration” – continuous policy experimentation under 
the direction of agency administrators.  Here was a revolution, indeed. 
In the decades leading up to Chevron, the Supreme Court had deferred to 
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes, but only where the 
agencies’ interpretations did not conflict with judicial precedent.  Once the 
Court affirmed an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, that 
interpretation became binding on both the agency and the Court on stare 
 
30 See Starr, supra note 26, at 284. 
31 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45. 
32 Id. at 839. 
33 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights 
from the Marshall Papers, [1993] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,606, 10,613 
(reviewing Justice Marshall’s private papers and suggesting that the Justices did not focus 
on Chevron’s precedential impact upon statutory interpretation generally); see also Merrill 
& Hickman, supra note 3, at 838 (explaining that Chevron first achieved prominence in the 
lower courts). 
34 See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 103 n.6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is, 
of course, of no importance that [an opinion] predates Chevron . . . .  As we made clear in 
Chevron, the interpretive maxims summarized therein were ‘well-settled principles.’” 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845)); Hickman, supra note 23, at 1578.  It should probably 
come as no surprise, therefore, that for several subsequent terms the Supreme Court cited 
Chevron only irregularly and interchangeably with other precedents. 
35 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64 (stating that agencies must consider “varying 
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis”). 
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decisis grounds.36  Although the Supreme Court deferred to reasonable agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes in the first instance, it steadfastly 
affirmed the principle of judicial supremacy in statutory interpretation by 
stressing that courts remain “the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction,”37 and by declining to allow agencies to revise their own 
statutory interpretations after the interpretations had been etched into judicial 
precedents.  If an agency wished to adopt a different policy after its prior 
statutory interpretation had been adopted by the Supreme Court, its sole 
recourse would be an appeal to Congress to revise the statute itself. 
Chevron unsettled this status quo by attacking the assumptions on which it 
rested – specifically, the traditional understanding that certainty and repose 
should trump agency flexibility in administrative law.  Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Stevens observed that the EPA had “consistently” 
interpreted the term “source” in the 1977 Amendments “flexibly – not in a 
sterile textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a 
technical and complex arena.”38  Justice Stevens reasoned that this flexible 
approach to statutory interpretation should prevail over the Court’s traditional 
preference for consistency and finality: 
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation 
of the term “source” does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude 
that no deference should be accorded the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute.  An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.  
On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must 
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a 
continuing basis.39 
Traditional concerns for consistency and finality in statutory interpretation 
have a weaker claim to authority in this context, the Court suggested, because 
the very “definition [of the term ‘source’] itself is flexible, particularly since 
Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the 
statute.”40  Thus, the EPA could reasonably give “the word ‘source’ . . . a 
plantwide definition for some purposes and a narrower definition for other 
purposes.”41  Alternatively, the EPA could preliminarily adopt the bubble 
concept for plant modifications as its official position but later reverse course 
based on a change of policy, perspective, or presidential administration.42  No 
longer would the EPA have to bind itself to official positions on questions of 
 
36 See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (stating that 
“considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily . . . in statutory construction,” since Congress 
may simply modify the statute if they disagree with the Court). 
37 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
38 Id. at 863. 
39 Id. at 863-64. 
40 Id. at 864 
41 Id. at 856. 
42 Id. at 863-65. 
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statutory interpretation that it might later regret with the benefit of a “full 
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation.”43  
Instead of carving the meaning of statutes in stone, Chevron directed courts to 
give agencies the discretion necessary for continuous experimentation, 
deliberation, and policy reassessment. 
3.  Chevron and Stare Decisis 
Once the Supreme Court decided in Chevron that agencies should be 
permitted to “consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on 
a continuing basis”44 rather than commit to a fixed statutory meaning, the 
question naturally arose whether courts must relax stare decisis to facilitate 
agencies’ flexible statutory interpretation.  After all, if flexible agency 
administration is preferable to judicial finality in certain contexts, as Chevron 
presupposes, why should courts use stare decisis to make agencies commit to 
particular interpretations of ambiguous statutes?  This question was of central 
importance in the Chevron litigation because it had been raised in the 
proceedings below and, indeed, was the primary rationale for the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision.45 
A brief history of the Chevron litigation serves to place the stare decisis 
question in context.  Throughout the 1970s, the EPA had adopted various 
official interpretations of the term “source” in the Clean Air Act 
Amendments.46  Of immediate importance to the Chevron litigation was a rule 
proposed in 1979 “that would have permitted the use of the ‘bubble concept’ 
for new installations within a plant as well as for modifications of existing 
units.”47  The D.C. Circuit rejected this proposal on statutory interpretation 
grounds in two decisions, ASARCO Inc. v. EPA48 and Alabama Power Co. v. 
Costle,49 holding that the bubble concept could not be employed in a program 
designed to enhance air quality.50  Initially, the EPA complied with the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision by promulgating a revised rule that was consistent with the 
circuit court’s holding.  Soon after President Ronald Reagan took office, 
however, the EPA pressed the issue once again, adopting a formal rule in 
October 1981 that resurrected the bubble concept for modification of existing 
 
43 Id. at 844. 
44 Id. at 863-64. 
45 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(holding the court is “impelled by the force of our precedent” in determining that the 
“regulatory change . . . is impermissible”), rev’d, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
46 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855-56. 
47 Id. at 855. 
48 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
49 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
50 See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 402; ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 329 (rejecting the bubble 
concept as applied to the 1977 Amendments). 
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units.51  Once again, the D.C. Circuit struck down the EPA’s regulation, this 
time relying principally on ASARCO, Alabama Power, and stare decisis.52  As 
far as the circuit court was concerned, the legal meaning of the term “source” 
in the 1977 Amendments had been resolved conclusively by ASARCO and 
Alabama Power and could not be reopened by a new administration’s 
unilateral directive. 
Had the Supreme Court chosen to do so, it could have ignored the D.C. 
Circuit’s stare decisis argument in Chevron.  Clearly, the ASARCO and 
Alabama Power decisions could not bind the Supreme Court as a matter of 
stare decisis.  The Court was therefore free to ignore the stare decisis issue that 
troubled the D.C. Circuit and examine the underlying question of statutory 
interpretation afresh.  Given this context, it is noteworthy that the Court 
reached out to criticize not only the D.C. Circuit’s failure to defer to the EPA 
in ASARCO and Alabama Power, but also the circuit court’s continued reliance 
upon these circuit precedents as a matter of stare decisis: “The basic legal error 
of the Court of Appeals,” Justice Stevens emphasized, “was to adopt a static 
judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that 
Congress itself had not commanded that definition.”53  Put simply, the D.C. 
Circuit should have resisted the impulse to enforce its own “static” statutory 
interpretation via stare decisis rather than honor the EPA’s discretion to 
experiment with different reasonable interpretations over time.  Chevron thus 
challenged the supremacy of stare decisis in statutory interpretation and 
offered a new vision of continuous, flexible, agency-directed statutory 
administration. 
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified and reaffirmed the relationship 
between Chevron and stare decisis in National Cable & Telecommunications 
Service v. Brand X Internet Services.54  “The whole point of Chevron,” the 
Court explained, “is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a 
statute with the implementing agency. . . .  Chevron’s premise is that it is for 
agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”55  For this reason, “[o]nly a judicial 
precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s 
 
51 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and 
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981). 
52 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(“This court’s prior adjudications in Alabama Power and ASARCO preclude us from 
sanctioning EPA’s employment of the bubble concept in the Clean Air Act’s nonattainment 
program.”), rev’d, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
53 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added). 
54 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (holding that Chevron deference applies to the FCC’s 
interpretation of the Communications Act). 
55 Id. at 981-82 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)); see also United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Where Chevron 
applies, statutory ambiguities remain ambiguities subject to the agency’s ongoing 
clarification.  They create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency 
discretion.”). 
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interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a 
conflicting agency construction.”56 
By clarifying what was at stake in Chevron’s vision of flexible agency 
administration, Brand X also demonstrated why Chevron was revolutionary 
and potentially controversial.  For traditionalists, Chevron’s requirement that 
courts defer to administrative agencies’ shifting interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes on a continuing basis – even in the face of conflicting judicial 
interpretations – seemed to sweep aside the core rule-of-law values at the heart 
of judicial statutory interpretation.57  Rather than seeking to standardize 
statutory meaning, as courts had traditionally done, the Supreme Court in 
Chevron and Brand X shunned stare decisis and celebrated interpretive 
pluralism, policy flexibility, and a new spirit of regulatory experimentation and 
innovation.  Where Chevron applied, statutory ambiguities were now “within 
the control of the Executive Branch for the future.”58  Even the most 
enthusiastic advocates of flexible agency administration recognized the need 
for a robust theory to buttress Chevron’s political stability in the midst of 
persistent theoretical pluralism. 
B. After the Revolution: Debating Chevron’s Foundation 
What that stabilizing theory should look like was less clear.  Although 
Chevron’s basic canon of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes quickly gained widespread acceptance across the political spectrum, 
scholars disagreed profoundly about precisely why the Supreme Court was 
justified in deferring to the EPA’s dynamic interpretation of the 1977 Clean 
Air Act Amendments.  Seeking to stabilize Chevron’s theoretical 
underpinnings, commentators proposed grounding Chevron deference in 
various comprehensive theories of the administrative state, from constitutional 
formalism to deliberative democracy to the unitary executive thesis.59  These 
comprehensive theories of the administrative state, in turn, generated 
competing rationales for Chevron deference, including implicit congressional 
delegation, administrative expertise, the executive branch’s political 
accountability for agency policy, agencies’ capacity for rational, transparent 
deliberation, and the need for uniformity in statutory administration.  Some of 
these rationales predated Chevron.  Most claimed authority in Chevron’s text.  
 
56 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83. 
57 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I know of no case, in the entire 
history of the federal courts, in which we have allowed a judicial interpretation of a statute 
to be set aside by an agency – or have allowed a lower court to render an interpretation of a 
statute subject to correction by an agency.”); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in 
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941-56 (1992) (arguing that Chevron 
undermines the ideal of stability in statutory interpretation); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, 
Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1430 (2005). 
58 Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
59 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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Several surfaced in Chevron’s wake.  Each gained adherents in some circles 
but was rejected in others.  Disagreement persists to this day concerning 
Chevron’s optimal theoretical foundation.60 
1. Congressional Delegation 
Arguably the leading rationale for Chevron deference is the presumption 
that Congress delegates interpretive authority to administrative agencies when 
it commits regulatory statutes to agency administration.  Although this 
“congressional delegation” rationale is often cited as Chevron’s signature 
contribution to statutory interpretation,61 the notion that Chevron introduced 
this rationale is not entirely accurate.  Long before Chevron, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that the task of interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions was 
“committed”62 or “assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to 
administer the Act.”63  In 1974, for example, the Supreme Court explained in 
Morton v. Ruiz64 that an agency’s administrative responsibility “necessarily 
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”65  Chevron provided greater depth to the 
congressional delegation thesis, however, by distinguishing “express” from 
“implied” delegations and approving both types of delegation as grounds for 
deference: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.  Sometimes the legislative delegation to 
an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.  In such 
a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
 
60 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
61 See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 23, at 1548 (“The more revolutionary . . . aspect of 
Chevron is its call for strong, mandatory deference . . . where Congress implicitly delegates 
rulemaking authority through the combination of statutory ambiguity and administrative 
responsibility, as exemplified by the Clean Air Act and the EPA.”). 
62 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 327 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
63 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944). 
64 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
65 Id. at 231; see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (“[T]he Act 
commits [statutory interpretation] in the first instance to the Attorney General and his 
delegates, and their construction . . . should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply 
because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute.”); Train v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961) 
(citing Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1904)). 
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provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.66 
Put simply, whether or not Congress has expressly authorized an agency to 
decide questions of statutory interpretation, courts must construe gaps and 
ambiguities in regulatory statutes as implicit delegations of policymaking 
authority to administrative agencies. 
If the congressional delegation theory was “well-established” and relatively 
uncontested before Chevron,67 it has proven to be deeply controversial in 
Chevron’s wake.  Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit has argued the 
assumption “that silence or ambiguity confers that kind of interpretative 
authority on the agency is unacceptable, for it assumes the very point in issue 
and thus ‘fails to distinguish between statutory ambiguities on the one hand 
and legislative delegations of law-interpreting power to agencies on the 
other.’”68  The contextual case for a presumption of congressional delegation is 
equally tenuous.  Congress has never enacted legislation containing a general 
delegation of interpretive authority to an administrative agency, and, as 
Thomas Merrill has argued, Congress’s general “practice of enacting specific 
delegations of interpretative authority suggests that Congress understands that 
no such general authority exists.”69  Critics of the congressional delegation 
theory have argued persuasively that Congress expressly disclaimed any such 
intent to delegate interpretive authority in the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) by directing reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of 
 
66 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) 
(citation omitted). 
67 Id. at 845; see also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (“It is thus 
evident that Congress made a conscious decision to continue its delegation to the Board of 
the primary responsibility of marking out the scope of the statutory language and of the 
statutory duty to bargain.”). 
68 CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of 
Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988)).  The 
congressional delegation theory begs the question, moreover, whether “congressional 
intent” is itself a coherent concept.  See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (“Although Congress has broad 
power to decide what kind of judicial review should apply to what kind of administrative 
decision, Congress so rarely discloses (or, perhaps, even has) a view on this subject as to 
make a search for legislative intent chimerical and a conclusion regarding that intent 
fraudulent in the mine run of cases.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real 
sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition.”). 
69 Merrill, supra note 22, at 995; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 
538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003) (“[C]ongressional silence often reflects an expectation that courts 
will look to the common law to fill gaps in statutory text . . . .”). 
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law.”70  When all is said and done, therefore, the best argument for the 
congressional delegation theory may rest on legislative inaction; namely, that 
Congress has not intervened to suppress Chevron’s revolution.71  But this post 
hoc rationale offers, at best, a tenuous justification for flexible agency 
administration.  Unless Congress speaks more plainly to the issue in the future, 
critics’ discontent with the congressional delegation theory is unlikely to 
subside. 
2. Agency Expertise 
Administrative agencies’ superior experience and expertise in particular 
regulatory fields offers a second popular justification for Chevron deference.  
Prior to Chevron, courts frequently deferred to agencies based on agencies’ 
greater familiarity with statutes’ legislative history and congressional intent, 
better access to information about the regulated industries or activities, and 
practical day-to-day experience administering regulatory statutes.72  Justice 
Stephen Breyer has observed that agencies may “have had a hand in drafting” 
regulatory statutes, and their staff maintain “close contact with the relevant 
legislators and staffs,” giving them insight into “current congressional views, 
which, in turn, may, through institutional history, reflect prior 
understandings.”73  Statutes under agency administration often address 
technical subjects using industry-specific terminology, which agencies are 
better equipped to comprehend, contextualize, and apply.74  Because such 
 
70 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in 
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 194-95 (1998) (observing that “commentators in 
administrative law have ‘generally acknowledged’ that [the APA] seems to require de novo 
review on questions of law”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 865; Panel Discussion, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 
368 (1987) (comments of Cass Sunstein) (“If there’s any evidence of congressional views in 
the meantime, those views are very much in accord with the original spirit of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, that is, that administrative agency interpretations of law 
should not be deferred to.”). 
71 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (stating that Congress is 
aware that its statutory ambiguities “will be resolved by the implementing agency”). 
72 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944); Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). 
73 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 368 (1986). 
74 Starr, supra note 26, at 309-10; see also Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: 
Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 774-75 
(1991) (“Once the issue is shifted to one of means, expertise is reflected primarily in the 
assessment of the likely outcomes of policy alternatives. Such assessments should be 
entitled to deference . . . .”); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative 
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 574 (1985) (arguing that “interpretive expertise might be 
based on any one of three possible grounds: (1) access to greater knowledge or evidence of 
statutory meaning; (2) an interpretive process better suited to yielding correct solutions; or 
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statutes are often highly complex, courts rely on agencies’ expertise to 
anticipate the effects of the courts’ interpretations on the regulatory scheme as 
a whole.  Giving deference to agency expertise, courts may then select the 
interpretation that will best promote the program’s purpose.  For all these 
reasons, courts before Chevron deferred to agencies’ expert judgments 
regarding the “best” reading of ambiguous statutes. 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court marshaled these expertise-based arguments 
in support of flexible agency administration.  The Court stressed that the Clean 
Air Act required the EPA to administer Congress’s “policy decisions in a 
technical and complex arena.”75  Although Congress did not decide the policy 
issues presented in Chevron “on the level of specificity presented by these 
cases,” Congress might have thought “that those with great expertise and 
charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better 
position to do so.”76  Whether members of Congress actually shared such intent 
to delegate this important policy decision to the EPA “matters not,” the Court 
reasoned.77  “Judges are not experts in the field” and therefore should allow 
agency administrators to administer statutes flexibly based on their relevant 
expertise.78 
Some scholars have argued vigorously that this expertise theory offers the 
best rationale for Chevron deference,79 but the expertise theory has also 
attracted criticism.  For decades, opponents have argued that “expertise” 
cannot be exercised objectively and instead simply masks value-laden policy 
decisions.80  Agency expertise may lack traction or take second-billing to 
political considerations in contexts where agency policy impacts the 
distribution of resources between competing economic interests.  Furthermore, 
even assuming expertise might be valuable in statutory interpretation 
generally, it is not clear that it necessitates Chevron deference. Agency 
expertise may be compromised by faulty assumptions or institutional biases.  
Sensitive questions of agency statutory interpretation often are committed to 
 
(3) motivation by a set of preferences more conducive to accurate identification of statutory 
meaning”). 
75 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863, 865 
(1984). 
76 Id. at 865. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 754. 
80 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683-87 (1975); see also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating 
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 (2002) (“[T]he legal realists’ hope 
that legal ambiguities could be resolved by objective policy expertise has long ago grown 
quaint. . . .  In practice, it is rare to find a field of social policy where there are not experts 
on opposing sides of an issue, . . . undermining any claim to an objective expert 
resolution.”). 
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political appointees or legal counsel rather than agency specialists.81  In recent 
years, the simmering tension between politics and expertise in agency 
decision-making has boiled over into the public sphere.  Officials at the EPA, 
NASA, and the Office of the Surgeon General have criticized the Bush 
Administration for discounting, ignoring, or redacting agencies’ expert 
findings and recommendations in pursuit of ideological objectives.82  The 
Supreme Court itself seems to be growing increasingly concerned about this 
systematic neglect and politicization of agency expertise, as Jody Freeman and 
Adrian Vermeule have observed.83  To presume that agency statutory 
interpretations are based upon expert judgment is to endorse an impressive 
legal fiction. 
3. Political Accountability 
Another rationale for Chevron deference focuses upon agencies’ 
relationship with the White House.  If questions of statutory interpretation 
require sensitive moral judgments or choices between competing interests or 
visions of the public good, perhaps these issues should be determined by “the 
incumbent administration[]” rather than by the judiciary: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices – resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or 
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the 
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.84 
Since the interpretation of ambiguous statutes under agency administration 
“really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, . . . federal judges –  who 
have no constituency – have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made 
by those who do.”85  Unlike the federal judiciary, administrative agencies make 
policy under the President’s electoral mandate.  The President oversees the 
implementation of agency policy and is politically accountable for the success 
or failure of agency administration.86  Thus, questions in statutory 
 
81 See HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER 58-66 (5th ed. 1998). 
82 See, e.g., Editorial, Censorship on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A1 
(describing the EPA’s censorship of a scientific report); Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert 
Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1; Jeremy Symons, How 
Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B04; Julie Rovner, Ex-
Surgeon General Says Administration Interfered, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, July 10, 2007, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11854247. 
83 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 92. 
84 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). 
85 Id. at 866. 
86 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-
Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2626-27 (2006). 
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interpretation that necessitate “assessing the wisdom of such policy choices 
and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are 
not judicial ones”; rather, they are committed to “the political branches.”87  
This rationale for Chevron deference bears close affinities to unitary executive 
theories of the administrative state that seek to anchor all agency policymaking 
in the President’s constitutional and popular mandate.88 
Several arguments have been leveled against attempts to link Chevron 
deference to the executive branch’s political accountability.  As Justice Stevens 
recognized in Chevron, “agencies are not directly accountable to the people.”89  
Nor are individual agency employees – political appointees and career staff – 
directly accountable to the people.  The legitimacy of an agency’s interpretive 
lawmaking under Chevron arguably depends, therefore, upon a theory that all 
regulatory policy takes shape under the direction and approval of the Chief 
Executive.90  Yet this unitary executive vision of executive lawmaking does 
not comport with reality.  Although the President exercises general oversight 
authority over the federal bureaucracy, Congress has insulated many types of 
agency policymaking from direct presidential control by committing these 
decisions to independent agencies or administrative law judges,91 and agencies 
have been known to repel White House interference in regulatory 
policymaking.92  Moreover, as a practical matter, the President cannot 
personally review every regulation that might one day lead to litigation.93  
Direct presidential policymaking in agency statutory administration is 
 
87 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
88 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The 
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2005). 
89  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
90 Id. at 865.  But see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the 
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 47, 50-51 (2006) (arguing, contrary to conventional wisdom, that agency 
policymaking may be more conducive to transparency and political accountability than 
White House policymaking). 
91 See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (granting authority to the U.S. 
Tax Court to construe statutes and rules); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 
(1989) (authorizing the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an independent body 
that promulgates binding guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) 
(authorizing the creation of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute “free from 
executive supervision”); see also Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 74, at 813 (observing that 
the President’s “supervisory power over agencies . . . is largely limited to executive 
departmental agencies”). 
92 See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative 
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 736 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer]. 
93 See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 90, at 50; Merrill, supra note 22, at 996 
(“[I]t is simply unrealistic, given the vastness of the federal bureaucracy, to expect that the 
President or his principal lieutenants can effectively monitor the policymaking activities of 
all federal agencies.”); Strauss, Overseer, supra note 92, at 754. 
  
1290 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1271 
 
exceptional; the vast majority of regulatory decisions that aspire to Chevron 
deference cannot be traced neatly to any discrete White House policy directive.  
Thus, if Chevron deference is truly based upon a theory that all regulatory 
policy emanates from the popularly elected President, Justice Stevens’s 
opinion would not be “this generation’s Erie,” as Cass Sunstein has asserted,94 
but rather the elevation of a new “brooding omnipresence in the sky”95 for our 
generation – the omniscient, omnipotent Chief Executive. 
Even assuming that the President could exercise effective control over 
agency statutory interpretation, some scholars have argued that presidential 
administration alone would not legitimate Chevron deference.  For example, an 
agency’s responsiveness to political pressures may be a disadvantage if it 
forces agencies to disregard their own views as informed by experience and 
expertise.96  Lisa Schultz Bressman has argued persuasively that mere political 
accountability cannot justify Chevron deference if an agency’s statutory 
interpretation is manifestly irrational97 or adopted only informally.98  
Moreover, although the President clearly bears responsibility for his or her 
administration’s general performance, the degree to which any single agency 
statutory interpretation impacts the President’s approval rating may be 
negligible.  For all these reasons and many more,99 attempts to justify Chevron 
based on presidential administration remain controversial. 
 
94 Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2598. 
95 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the common law is “not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some 
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified”). 
96 Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 74, at 814 (demonstrating the tension between 
majoritarianism and expertise in agency policymaking); see also Michael Herz, Imposing 
Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 249 (1993). 
97 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 463-64, 503-15 (2003) (arguing that a 
focus on accountability to legitimize agency interpretation “overlooks the ever-present risk 
of arbitrariness”). 
98 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1449 (“Procedural 
formality, whether imposed under constitutional law or administrative law, always has been 
a necessary feature of governmental legitimacy.”). 
99 See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 284 (2006) (arguing that the White House cannot compel agencies 
to adopt a particular statutory interpretation in contexts where Congress has committed the 
decision to an agency administrator by express statutory command); Strauss, Overseer, 
supra note 92, at 704-05 (“[W]here Congress has assigned a function to a named agency 
subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President’s role . . . is that of 
overseer and not decider.”). 
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4. National Uniformity, Responsiveness, Inherent Authority, and 
Deliberative Rationality 
A variety of other rationales have surfaced post-Chevron to support flexible 
agency administration.  Peter Strauss has proposed that Chevron be understood 
as a device to ensure uniformity in federal administrative law: by committing 
ambiguous statutory provisions to executive interpretation, courts reduce the 
likelihood that circuit splits will cast a pall of uncertainty over unitary 
regulatory programs.100  Cass Sunstein has emphasized the executive’s ability 
to react quickly and decisively to “update” statutes in response to changing 
circumstances.101  Justice Antonin Scalia, Jack Goldsmith, and John Manning 
have gone so far as to suggest the President might have an independent 
constitutional power to fill gaps in statutes.102  Other commentators have 
stressed the need for deliberative rationality in regulatory policymaking, 
arguing that agencies are better at collecting and synthesizing information 
through rulemaking processes than are courts through litigation.103  In sum, a 
host of theories have sprung up over the past quarter-century to justify 
Chevron’s revolution. 
C. Justice Stevens’s Pragmatic Solution 
Given these diverse rationales for judicial deference to agency statutory 
interpretations, Chevron raised a delicate question: should the Supreme Court 
ground flexible agency administration in a theory of congressional delegation, 
agency expertise, political responsiveness and accountability, or some other 
principle?  Had Justice Stevens attempted to ground Chevron’s innovative 
deference doctrine in a single foundational theory for flexible agency 
administration, his opinion likely would have incited bitter dissents and 
concurrences and undermined the decision’s now-iconic status in statutory 
interpretation. 
The subtle genius of Justice Stevens’s Chevron opinion – and the reason 
why it endures as a landmark case in American statutory interpretation today – 
is that it unites disparate comprehensive theories into a consensus-based 
coalition favoring flexible agency administration.  Justice Stevens recognized 
that under any of the leading comprehensive rationales for deference to 
administrative agencies, the EPA’s decision-making process was sufficiently 
 
100 Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 3, at 1112; see also E. Donald Elliott, 
Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and 
Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2005). 
101 See Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2587-88, 2595. 
102 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “a background rule of law against which Congress legislates” is that 
“[a]mbiguity means Congress intended agency discretion”); Goldsmith & Manning, supra 
note 3, at 2297-2301. 
103 See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 469, 484-86 (1986). 
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rigorous and the statute under review was sufficiently ambiguous to compel the 
conclusion that the questions of statutory interpretation before the Court were 
“not judicial ones.”104  By pursuing political harmony and practical wisdom 
rather than ideological purity, Chevron cleared a space of relative stability in a 
field of law otherwise beset by intractable theoretical conflict.  In this respect, 
Chevron followed a path marked by political philosopher John Rawls: the 
pragmatic “overlapping consensus.” 
1. Rawls’s Overlapping Consensus 
A decade before the Supreme Court decided Chevron, Rawls foreshadowed 
the decision’s antifoundationalist approach in A Theory of Justice by 
introducing the concept of an “overlapping consensus.”105  Rawls’s primary 
concern in A Theory of Justice was to defend his vision of “justice as 
fairness.”106  In a seminal passage, Rawls argued the diverse members of a 
liberal democracy could all embrace “the same principles of justice” despite 
“considerable differences in citizens’ conceptions of justice” – whether they be 
Kantian, utilitarian, or any other high-level theory – insofar as “these 
conceptions lead to similar political judgments.”107  Where “different premises 
can yield the same conclusion,” Rawls reasoned, “there exists what we may 
refer to as overlapping rather than strict consensus.”108  For Rawls, the 
conception of “justice as fairness” was one such overlapping consensus – a 
mutually acceptable political conception that could bind together 
fundamentally different comprehensive theories of “justice” through 
reciprocity.  Although reasonable citizens might hold diverse and seemingly 
irreconcilable conceptions of the public good, they could also accept “justice 
as fairness” as a focal point of overlapping consensus, recognizing that “their 
views support the same judgment in the situation at hand, and would do so 
even should their respective positions be interchanged.”109 
In subsequent writings, Rawls clarified the mechanics and utility of the 
overlapping consensus.  The primary virtue of an overlapping consensus, 
according to Rawls, is that it addresses moral pluralism’s challenge to public 
justification in political philosophy.110  Rawls argues that under what he terms 
the “liberal principle of legitimacy,” any attempt to prescribe foundational 
moral principles for constitutional democracies must accommodate citizens’ 
heterogeneous religious, philosophical, and moral commitments on their own 
terms.111  To elevate a single, comprehensive conception of “justice” to the 
 
104 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
105 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 388. 
106 Id. at 3. 
107 Id. at 387 (emphasis added). 
108 Id. at 387-88. 
109 Id. at 388. 
110 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 15. 
111 Id. at 10, 137; see also Rawls, Domain, supra note 4, at 239. 
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detriment of other reasonable conceptions would transform the state into an 
intolerably oppressive partisan force in the contest between religious, 
philosophical and moral traditions.  Instead, constitutional democracy must be 
grounded in a shared political conception of justice acceptable to all: the 
golden overlapping consensus.112 
Rawls’s pragmatic, consensus-based approach to public justification 
eschews metaphysics and epistemology in favor of practical reason.  Rather 
than focus on first principles, Rawls argues that “citizens’ reasoning in the 
public forum about constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice . . . 
is now best guided by a political conception” of justice, which embodies 
“principles and values of which all citizens can endorse.”113  When a true 
overlapping consensus is achieved, citizens who advocate competing 
comprehensive theories will be able to “endorse the political conception, each 
from its own point of view.”114  Each can view the political conception “as 
derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other 
values.”115 
Rawls argues that an overlapping consensus facilitates social harmony and 
mutual respect – essential ingredients for political stability in a pluralist 
constitutional democracy.  To explain how this is so, Rawls contrasts the 
overlapping consensus with a modus vivendi or “treaty between two states 
whose national aims and interests put them at odds.”116  According to Rawls, 
states design treaties to promote their respective national interests.  In most 
instances, however, “both states are ready to pursue their goals at the expense 
of the other, and should conditions change they may do so.”117  Thus, a treaty 
built on independent interests is “inevitably fragile,” because it is “founded 
solely on self- or group-interest.”118  In contrast, an overlapping consensus is 
not merely the “equilibrium point” where competing interests converge, but a 
moral conception that unites disparate philosophical and religious traditions.119  
Because citizens can view the political conception of “justice as fairness” as a 
reflection of their own comprehensive moral doctrines, they “will not withdraw 
their support of it should the relative strength of their view in society increase 
and eventually become dominant.”120  For Rawls, the generally acceptable 
 
112 See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
6 (1987) [hereinafter Rawls, Overlapping Consensus] (“Given the fact of pluralism, and 
given that justification begins from some consensus, no general and comprehensive doctrine 
can assume the role of a publicly acceptable basis of political justice.”). 
113 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 10. 
114 Id. at 134; Rawls, Domain, supra note 4, at 239. 
115 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 11. 
116 Id. at 147. 
117 Id. 
118 Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 112, at 2. 
119 See id. 
120 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 148. 
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political abstraction of “fairness” provided a recipe for building consensus, 
fostering cooperation and mutual respect, and minimizing antagonism in a 
pluralist society divided by diverse moral codes. 
2. Sunstein’s Incompletely Theorized Agreement 
While Rawls would build political consensus around an abstract conception 
of justice, Cass Sunstein has argued that legal reasoning is often best served by 
“incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by 
agreements on the narrow or low-level principles that account for them.”121  
Put simply, judges may agree about which party should prevail on a legal 
claim even if they are unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable high-level 
theory to justify that result.  For example, three judges on a federal circuit 
panel could agree that images alleged to be child pornography are subject to 
state regulation without sharing a common definition of pornography or a 
comprehensive theory of the First Amendment.  Sunstein suggests that in these 
circumstances courts might find it useful to avoid grand theory and instead 
develop low-level rules that formalize and institutionalize judges’ overlapping 
intuitions regarding the appropriate outcome for particular cases. 
Sunstein expressly contrasts incompletely theorized agreements with 
Rawls’s overlapping consensus.  Rawls’s overlapping consensus eschews 
comprehensive theories of the public good in favor of abstractions such as 
“fairness” that reduce friction and enhance social cohesion.  In Rawls’s view, 
“the deeper the conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to which we must 
ascend to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots.”122  Sunstein takes the 
opposite approach.  He writes: 
The distinctly legal solution to the problem of pluralism is to produce 
agreement on particulars, with the thought that often people who are 
puzzled by general principles, or who disagree on them, can agree on 
individual cases.  When we disagree on the relatively abstract, we can 
often find agreement by moving to lower levels of generality.123 
Whereas Rawls advocates “conceptual ascent” to a higher level of abstraction 
as a strategy for defusing political conflict, Sunstein proposes conceptual 
descent as a strategy for achieving consensus that he thinks is better suited to 
judicial decision-making in a common law system. 
Whether based on a high-level abstraction such as “fairness” or the low-
level particular facts of a given case, the two pragmatic approaches advanced 
by Rawls and Sunstein share the same basic aspirations.  Both approaches 
 
121 SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 5, at 37; see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely 
Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1736 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Agreements] (explaining that when judges “disagree on an abstraction, they move to a level 
of greater particularity” to reach a particular outcome). 
122 SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 5, at 47 (quoting RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 46). 
123 Id. 
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harness the overlapping consensus between disparate moral, political, and 
jurisprudential traditions.  In so doing, both approaches offer a path to political 
stability and social cohesion even in the midst of persistent theoretical conflict. 
3. A Consensus for Flexible Agency Administration 
Chevron’s defense of flexible agency administration in statutory 
construction bears important similarities to both Rawls’s overlapping 
consensus and Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreement.  The primary 
challenge confronting the Court in Chevron was to construct a public 
justification for flexible agency statutory administration that would command 
the allegiance of reasonable jurists across the political and jurisprudential 
spectrum.  Given the vast diversity of viewpoints concerning the proper 
relationship between courts and agencies in statutory administration, the Court 
could not provide a stable public justification for Chevron deference without 
addressing the leading comprehensive theories of the administrative process.  
If the Court tethered flexible agency administration exclusively to a single 
comprehensive theory of the administrative process, it would undermine 
Chevron’s political durability and compromise its long-term viability. 
Enter Justice Stevens, author of the Supreme Court’s unanimous Chevron 
opinion.  In recent years, Justice Stevens has gained a reputation as the Roberts 
Court’s most vociferous “dissenter,”124 but in an earlier era he was better 
known as the Court’s preeminent pragmatist.125  Justice Stevens’s pragmatic 
judicial philosophy is illustrated in Burnham v. Superior Court of 
California,126 where the Supreme Court considered whether “tag jurisdiction” 
would satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.127  In separate 
opinions, Justices Scalia and Brennan debated whether a defendant’s actual 
physical presence in a forum was sufficient as a matter of law to establish 
personal jurisdiction or whether the controlling legal standard was instead 
“minimum contacts.”128  Justice White, who shared Justice Stevens’s penchant 
for pragmatism, argued that the trial court’s assertion of jurisdiction under such 
circumstances had not been shown to be “so arbitrary and lacking in common 
 
124 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2007, at 50, 50, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html. 
125 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 240 
(1999) (listing Stevens alongside other judicial pragmatists such as Justices Holmes, 
Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, White, and Breyer); 
Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE 157, 
177-79 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice 
Stevens’s Free Speech Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2201 (2006). 
126 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
127 Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
128 Compare id. at 607-28 (finding physical presence sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction), with id. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (proposing 
“minimum contacts” as the appropriate standard). 
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sense” as to necessitate reversal.129  Justice Stevens, for his part, declined to 
take sides in the debate among these three approaches.  Instead, he filed a short 
concurring opinion stating that “it is sufficient to note that the historical 
evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of 
fairness identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by 
Justice White, all combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy 
case.”130  If all nine Justices could agree that the Fourteenth Amendment 
permitted tag jurisdiction according to their own jurisprudential theories, the 
Court need not decide whether Justice Scalia’s originalist theory, Justice 
Brennan’s teleological/evolutionary theory, or some other comprehensive 
theory best defined the demands of constitutional due process. 
In the Supreme Court’s unanimous Chevron opinion, Justice Stevens 
employed a similar consensus-based justification for flexible agency 
administration.  Foreshadowing Burnham, Justice Stevens refrained from 
taking sides in the debate between unitary executive theory, public choice 
theory, civic republicanism, and other comprehensive theories of the 
administrative process.  Instead, Justice Stevens spoke approvingly of each of 
these theories, arguing there were multiple overlapping justifications for 
Chevron deference, including implicit congressional delegation,131 agency 
expertise,132 presidential accountability,133 and inherent executive authority.134  
In this manner, Chevron laid the foundation for a pragmatic consensus in 
statutory interpretation: when an administrative agency engages in flexible 
statutory interpretation through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, 
citizens of diverse religious, philosophical, and moral perspectives could agree 
that courts ought to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory provisions. 
Justice Stevens’s effort to integrate multiple overlapping rationales for 
flexible agency administration was critical to establishing Chevron’s political 
stability.  As discussed previously, Chevron sparked a quiet revolution in 
statutory interpretation by holding that regulatory statutes need not be set in 
stone, thereby allowing agencies to define ambiguous statutory provisions 
flexibly, subject only to the spare constraints of reasonableness.  This 
 
129 Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
130 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
131 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984) (stating that “express delegation” exists when Congress “explicitly le[aves] a gap for 
the agency to fill”). 
132 See id. at 844, 865 (remarking that Congress gave deference to agencies because 
“those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision” 
would be better able to do so than Congress). 
133 See id. at 865 (indicating that the President’s direct accountability to the people makes 
it appropriate for the executive branch – including administrative agencies – to make policy 
decisions). 
134 See id. at 845 (arguing that “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer”). 
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unprecedented endorsement of flexible agency interpretation necessitated a 
robust political justification, one that would foster stability and mutual respect 
in a pluralist legal community. 
Lacking a unifying “political conception” of flexible agency administration 
akin to Rawls’s vision of “justice as fairness,” Justice Stevens instead 
grounded Chevron’s consensus in attributes of the EPA’s decision-making 
process.  The agency activities under review in Chevron sat serendipitously at 
the crossroads of the leading comprehensive theories of administrative 
governance: the Clean Air Act’s “regulatory scheme [was] technical and 
complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, 
and the decision involve[d] reconciling conflicting policies.”135  How best to 
vindicate industry emission standards without unduly retarding industry 
productivity was a sensitive policy question that rested squarely within the 
agency’s expertise.  The EPA had adopted the bubble concept through notice-
and-comment rulemaking, which allowed for public participation and reasoned 
deliberation.  In addition, the EPA’s return to the bubble concept in 1981 
followed a change in presidential administrations, suggesting that the EPA had, 
in fact, “rel[ied] upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to 
inform its judgments.”136  Finally, to the extent the Court explored Congress’s 
intent, Stevens’s opinion hypothesized a variety of plausible explanations for 
why Congress might have chosen to delegate authority to the EPA under the 
circumstances.137  Embracing all these rationales for deference as equally 
valid, the Supreme Court endorsed the EPA’s decision-making process in 
Chevron as the focal point for a consensus favoring flexible agency 
administration. 
As applied to traditional agency rulemakings like the EPA’s bubble rule, 
Chevron’s consensus-based justification for flexible agency administration has 
proven to be remarkably durable for nearly a quarter-century.  Judges, 
litigators, and academics of diverse political and jurisprudential commitments 
have embraced Chevron, each defending the decision as an expression of their 
otherwise discordant visions of the administrative state.138  Legislative 
supremacists defend Chevron’s implied congressional delegation thesis as a 
principled reconstruction of Congress’s intent.139  Legal realists, for their part, 
generally reject the congressional delegation thesis but emphasize functional 
 
135 Id. at 865. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 73, at 368; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517; Panel Discussion, supra 
note 70. 
139 See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (“Congress, when it left 
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the 
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency 
(rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”). 
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concerns such as the comparative advantages of agency expertise, uniformity, 
and dispatch.140  For advocates of a unitary executive model of the 
administrative state, Chevron seems to reinforce presidential primacy in 
regulatory policy.141  Chevron’s account of agencies relying on the current 
administration’s political priorities when “reconciling conflicting policies” 
likewise resonates for public choice theorists.142  Neopluralists and civic 
republicans emphasize the comparative advantages of agency deliberative 
procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking as a forum for public 
engagement and consensus-building in agency norm-entrepreneurship.143  
Justice Stevens’s polyphonic Chevron opinion thus speaks to readers in the 
language of their own comprehensive theories.  Jurists with diverse 
perspectives have hailed the decision as an affirmation of their own disparate 
visions of the administrative state. 
Chevron’s revolution has encountered resistance along the way, of course.  
In the years immediately following the decision, some scholars argued that 
flexible agency administration shifted the balance of power in statutory 
interpretation too far in the direction of executive discretion, inappropriately 
diminishing the judiciary’s traditional role.144  Such criticism was relatively 
thin during Chevron’s infancy, however, and it has only diminished with the 
passage of time.  To be sure, critics might yet argue that none of Chevron’s 
interwoven rationales for deference – including the consensus construct itself – 
suffices to legitimate Chevron as a matter of legal or political theory.  As a 
practical matter, however, the Chevron revolution is a fait accompli.  If 
Chevron has not achieved perfect consensus outside of the Supreme Court, the 
breadth of its appeal and the strength of its precedential authority among 
judges, academics, and practitioners of diverse views is nothing short of 
remarkable. 
 
140 See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Justice of Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive 
Claims of Independent Authority To Interpret the Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157, 
158-59 (2005) (describing “the legal realist view that assigning legal meaning is a choice of 
policy” as the “dominant paradigm” since Chevron); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 
3, at 2583 (characterizing Chevron as “a natural and proper outgrowth of . . . the legal realist 
attack on the autonomy of legal reasoning”). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Chevron rests, at least in part, on the executive’s inherent 
lawmaking authority); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 3, at 2297-2301. 
142 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 
(1961)). 
143 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 138 (advocating a deliberative democracy 
conception of Chevron that requires an agency to “persuasively explain its interpretation” to 
the public). 
144 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (expressing separation-of-powers 
concerns); Shapiro, supra note 57, at 941-56; Tyler, supra note 57, at 1430. 
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II. DECONSTRUCTING DELEGATION 
Justice Stevens’s singular achievement in Chevron was to construct a 
consensus in favor of flexible agency administration in contexts where 
agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to interpret 
ambiguous statutory provisions.  This pragmatic consensus earned Chevron 
widespread renown, but it also left a host of important questions unanswered.  
For example, did the Court in Chevron necessarily adopt all of the competing 
comprehensive rationales for deference?  If so, what should courts do when 
these rationales point in different directions?  Would Chevron command 
deference if agency administrators follow presidential directives but refuse to 
employ deliberative decision-making processes or disregard the expert 
opinions of career staff?  Would Chevron apply equally to legislative rules, 
interpretive rules, opinion letters, internal agency guidelines, informal policy 
statements, and agency litigation positions?  If not, where should courts draw 
the line between agency actions that fall within Chevron’s domain and those 
that do not? 
These questions illustrate a problem of central importance to Chevron’s 
legacy, characterized in recent commentary as “Step Zero,”145 namely: to what 
forms of agency action does Chevron apply?  Since 2001, the Supreme Court 
has attempted to address this problem by endorsing congressional delegation as 
the definitive test for Chevron deference.146  This approach has appeased some 
critics, irritated others, and perplexed the circuit courts.  Beneath the Supreme 
Court’s delegation rhetoric, however, the Court has continued to honor 
Chevron’s pragmatic spirit by granting Chevron deference only when agency 
decision-making processes satisfy five core rationales: congressional 
delegation, agency expertise, political responsiveness and accountability, 
deliberative rationality, and national uniformity. 
A. The Unbearable Lightness of Congressional Delegation 
For roughly a decade and a half after Chevron, the prevailing assumption 
among circuit courts and scholars was that the decision represented an 
“incompletely theorized agreement”147 that would require further clarification 
and refinement.  Many expected that the Supreme Court eventually would have 
to choose between the competing comprehensive rationales for Chevron 
deference.148  Law reviews overflowed with commentary on Chevron as 
 
145 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 224-26 (2006). 
146 Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32 (denying Chevron deference where there is no 
congressional delegation of authority to the agency). 
147 See generally Sunstein, Agreements, supra note 121 (discussing the mechanics of 
incompletely theorized agreements in other settings). 
148 See Hickman, supra note 23, at 1550 (“Scholars posited a variety of legal foundations 
for Chevron including not only congressional delegation but others ranging from 
constitutional requirement to mere judicial policy.  Changing Chevron’s underlying premise 
alters the scope of the doctrine’s applicability.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to 
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scholars advocated first one and then another foundational theory.  Neglecting 
the strength and stability of Chevron’s original consensus, proponents of 
various legal and political theories encouraged the Supreme Court to cut 
through the Gordian knot of Chevron’s interwoven rationales and anoint their 
particular theory as Chevron’s authoritative foundation.149 
The Supreme Court took the bait in United States v. Mead Corp.150  In an 
opinion authored by Justice David Souter, the Court denied Chevron deference 
to the U.S. Customs Service’s tariff classification rulings because there was 
“no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of 
law.”151  The Court explained that flexible agency administration under 
Chevron did not extend to all agency interpretive choices: “[A]gencies charged 
with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices, 
and . . . not all of those choices bind judges to follow them . . . .”152  Instead, 
Chevron deference applied to a limited “category of interpretive choices 
distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference.”153  That 
additional reason, the Court explained, was congressional delegation: 
This Court in Chevron recognized that Congress not only engages in 
express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that 
“[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit.”  Congress, that is, may not have expressly delegated 
authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a 
particular gap.  Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally 
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress 
would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it 
addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even 
one about which “Congress did not actually have an intent” as to a 
particular result.154 
By characterizing congressional delegation as the definitive test for Chevron 
deference, Mead limited Chevron’s scope to fields of administrative activity in 
 
Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997, 1005 (2007) (commenting 
that the “different explanations for deference” in Chevron prompted scholars “to debate 
Chevron’s legal underpinnings”). 
149 See supra Part I.B. 
150 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
151 Id. at 221. 
152 Id. at 227. 
153 Id. at 229.  Justice Breyer paved the way for this “additional reason” theory a year 
earlier when he argued in an influential dissent that Chevron “simply focused upon an 
additional, separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations, namely, that 
Congress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to make those determinations.”  
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 872, noted in Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.11. 
154 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984)). 
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which courts could reasonably infer that Congress would have intended to give 
agencies the authority to act with “the force of law.”155  Outside this limited 
domain, an agency might still receive deference under the Supreme Court’s 
pre-Chevron interpretive principles, as outlined in the 1944 decision Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co.,156 based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”157  However, outside Chevron’s domain, agencies would lack the 
same freedom to change course and experiment with different interpretations 
of ambiguous statutes. 
Since the Supreme Court decided Mead, circuit courts have construed the 
decision to mean that reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes 
receive Chevron deference “as long as Congress has delegated to agencies the 
power to make policy by interpreting ambiguous statutory language or filling 
gaps in regulatory laws.”158  Scholars have characterized the congressional 
delegation theory as the Supreme Court’s new “consensus view.”159  Thus, 
congressional delegation has been elevated rhetorically as the single, definitive 
test for Chevron deference, neglecting other comprehensive rationales for 
flexible agency administration. 
As one would expect, critics of the congressional delegation theory have 
greeted this development with consternation and disdain.  Shortly after the 
Supreme Court decided Mead, Ronald Krotoszynski decried the delegation 
theory as a “bad farce” that would yield insupportable results; an agency 
decision based upon public deliberation and expertise – but without implied 
delegation – would not qualify for Chevron deference, while agency policies 
adopted with no deliberation and contrary to expert judgment would qualify.160  
More troubling still were concerns that the congressional delegation theory 
was an emperor with no clothes.  As discussed previously, the evidentiary 
record supporting Chevron’s presumption that Congress intends to give 
agencies law-interpretive authority is perilously thin,161 leading many 
 
155 See id. at 226-27. 
156 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
157 Id. at 140, quoted in Mead, 533 U.S. at 228. 
158 Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2637 (2003); see 
also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006) (emphasizing the congressional 
delegation inquiry). 
159 Garrett, supra note 158, at 2637. 
160 Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 753. 
161 See Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2590 (arguing that when 
congressional delegation is “explored on a case-by-case basis, . . . it is likely that courts will 
be unable to find any clear expression of congressional will to that effect”).  The Chevron 
decision itself expressed skepticism in drawing inferences about congressional intent from 
statutory text.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
861 (1984) (“We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute 
will reveal an actual intent of Congress.”). 
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commentators to characterize the theory as a “legal fiction.”162  For some 
scholars, the very fact that congressional delegation was a “legal fiction” at all 
was a sufficiently grievous sin to justify abandoning Mead on principle.163  
Others raised more mundane concerns: as a legal fiction, the congressional 
delegation standard was simply too incoherent, too amorphous, and too 
indeterminate in practice to guide courts in defining Chevron’s reach.164  Far 
from quelling confusion regarding Chevron’s theoretical underpinnings, the 
Supreme Court’s delegation fiction simply deepened lower courts’ uncertainty 
about Chevron’s scope. 
B. Mead’s Veiled Consensus 
Taken at face value, the Supreme Court’s embrace of Mead’s delegation 
fiction could be construed as an abandonment of Chevron’s consensus.  As 
with any legal fiction, however, the impact of Mead’s delegation trope cannot 
be evaluated adequately without taking into account the ends to which it has 
been employed in practice.  Over a century ago, an article in the Harvard Law 
Review observed that legal fictions “may appear not merely absurd, but 
positively unjust and wrongful.”165  However, when viewed “in their proper 
relations[,] noting their cause and effect[,] the people among whom and the 
conditions under which they flourished[] – the absurdity and injustice may 
perhaps disappear.”166  So it is with Mead’s delegation fiction: on a superficial 
level, Mead appears to abandon Chevron’s pluralist consensus in favor of an 
unprincipled, unpredictable case-by-case analysis.  Dig deeper, however, and it 
becomes apparent that the Supreme Court actually employs Mead’s delegation 
fiction strategically to reach outcomes consistent with Chevron’s consensus-
based approach. 
In the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, Chevron’s domain has been 
circumscribed by five core rationales.  As explained in Part I, agency statutory 
 
162 See, e.g., Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing 
the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1212 (1990). 
163 See, e.g., Steven Croley, The Applicability of the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO 
JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 103, 115 (John F. Duffy & Michael 
Herz eds., 2005) (arguing that Mead compounds the delegation fiction by construing notice-
and-comment procedures as evidence of congressional intent); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, 
supra note 3, at 2589-94. 
164 See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1448 (arguing that 
Mead’s rationale has spawned uncertainty and confusion); Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 
751 (arguing that the congressional delegation’s fictional character makes it too easy for 
courts to infer delegation depending on how they want to decide a given case); Ronald M. 
Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 772, 782 
(2002) (criticizing Mead for endorsing a “daunting set of abstractions” and arguing that the 
Chevron/Skidmore distinction has “no functional justification”). 
165 Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or Detrimental 
to Its Growth?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 249, 251 (1893). 
166 Id. 
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interpretations qualify for Chevron deference when the agency (1) exercises 
delegated lawmaking authority; (2) respects expert judgment; (3) reflects 
political responsiveness and accountability; (4) promotes deliberative 
rationality; and (5) facilitates national uniformity.  Although the Supreme 
Court generally presumes as a preliminary matter that agency statutory 
interpretations qualify for Chevron deference, litigants may rebut this 
presumption by demonstrating that one or more of the five rationales remains 
unsatisfied.  If an agency’s policymaking process fails to satisfy a core 
constituency of Chevron’s consensus, the Supreme Court declines to apply 
Chevron’s two-step test, citing concerns that Congress could not have intended 
to delegate interpretive authority under the circumstances.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court applies Chevron deference only in contexts where agency decision-
making processes support a robust consensus. 
The Mead decision itself reflects the continuing relevance of Chevron’s 
consensus.  At the outset of the majority opinion, Justice Souter took pains to 
distinguish Chevron as a distinct “category of interpretive choices,” which 
involved not only agency expertise, presidential influence, formality, and 
deliberation – the traditional Skidmore factors – but also the crucial 
“additional” ingredient of congressionally delegated lawmaking authority.167  
Having drawn this distinction between Chevron and Skidmore, however, 
Justice Souter immediately proceeded to deconstruct the delegation theory by 
considering all of the Skidmore factors under the pretense of looking for 
congressional intent.  One “very good indicator of delegation,” Souter 
reasoned, would be “express congressional authorizations to engage in . . . 
relatively formal administrative procedure” such as “rulemaking or 
adjudication that . . . tend[s] to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of such force.”168  Souter noted further that tariff 
classification letters were not ordinarily approved by the Commissioner of 
Customs or the Secretary of the Treasury (much less the White House) prior to 
issuance and thus did not bear the hallmarks of political responsiveness or 
accountability.169  In addition, tariff classification letters could not reasonably 
be construed as an instrument for setting uniform national policy, Souter 
suggested, because the Custom Service’s forty-six offices around the country 
promulgated roughly 10,000 to 15,000 letters during the same year,170 and all 
such letters were subject to de novo review by the Court of International 
Trade.171 
 
167 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-29 (2001). 
168 Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added); see also id. at 231 n.13. 
169 Id. at 238 n.19; cf. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2006) (deferring 
to a Coast Guard determination that particular vessels represented a “high risk” of terrorist 
attack because the relevant security plan was “approved at a national level by the Coast 
Guard Commandant”). 
170 Mead, 533 U.S. at 233. 
171 Id. at 232-33. 
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For each of these reasons, the Court declined to infer delegation from the 
Customs Service’s statutory authority to “fix the final classification and rate” 
for tariff classifications.172  Instead, the Court looked beyond the mere 
delegation of lawmaking authority to the formality of the agency’s decision, 
whether the rule represented administration policy, and the degree of care and 
deliberation required in the decision-making process.173  Because the customs 
letter did not satisfy these factors crucial to Chevron’s consensus, Justice 
Souter and seven other Justices concluded the evidence of congressional 
delegation was insufficient.174 
Although Mead formally endorsed the congressional delegation theory as 
the definitive test for Chevron deference, the Supreme Court actually 
employed Mead’s delegation fiction primarily as a heuristic for highlighting 
the concerns that a reasonable legislator might consider when deciding whether 
to delegate interpretive authority to an administrative agency.  Because 
reasonable legislators of diverse perspectives might very well choose to 
condition Chevron deference on agency deliberation, applied expertise, 
political responsiveness, or other leading rationales, the Court must likewise 
consider these factors at Step Zero.  If any of the leading comprehensive 
theories for flexible agency administration remained unsatisfied, the Court 
could not be confident that Congress would have delegated interpretive 
authority to the Customs Service under the circumstances presented in Mead.  
Thus framed, Mead’s delegation fiction simply directed the Supreme Court 
back to Chevron’s original consensus. 
That the Mead majority employed the delegation fiction as a heuristic for 
considering multiple rationales for deference was not lost on the Court’s lone 
dissenter, Justice Scalia.  The majority’s multifactor inquiry was unacceptable, 
he argued, because Chevron rested on one, and only one, consideration: “[A] 
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for 
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be 
resolved . . . by the agency . . . .”175  In characteristically colorful prose, Justice 
 
172 Id. at 222 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1500(b) (2000)). 
173 Id. at 230. 
174 Id. at 231-32. 
175 Id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In fairness to Justice Scalia, many of the 
Supreme Court’s pre-Mead decisions did treat statutory gaps as prima facie evidence of 
congressional delegation.  See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988) 
(holding that “a reviewing court must give deference” to a reasonable agency interpretation 
of a statute where Congress “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue”).  On 
the other hand, the Court had also withheld deference in other cases where it found “reason 
to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation.”  FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).  For example, the Court 
declined to defer to: agency litigation positions, see, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988); interpretations raising “serious constitutional 
concerns,” see, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
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Scalia condemned the majority’s rejection of this simple delegation 
presumption for “th’ol ‘totality of the circumstances’ test” as an “avulsive 
change in judicial review of federal administrative action.”176  Justice Scalia 
mocked the majority’s concern for the lack of formality in Customs Service 
letters, noting that “[t]here is no necessary connection between the formality of 
procedure and the power of the entity administering the procedure to resolve 
authoritatively questions of law.”177  More generally, he belittled “the utter 
flabbiness” of the majority’s approach, which incorporated “a grab bag of 
other factors – including [but not limited to] the factor that used to be the sole 
criterion for Chevron deference: whether the interpretation represented the 
authoritative position of the agency.”178  The majority’s consideration of “the 
multifarious ways in which congressional intent can be manifested” would 
only lead to debilitating uncertainty in the lower federal courts, Justice Scalia 
prophesied.179 
The last six years have witnessed the fulfillment of Justice Scalia’s 
prophecy.  Indeed, federal circuit courts have struggled mightily to apply 
Mead’s multifactor test in a principled fashion, assuming (as did Justice Scalia) 
that delegation must now be determined by juggling a grab bag of disparate 
concerns.180  What these courts and Mead’s critics have failed to appreciate is 
that Justice Souter’s multifactor analysis was never intended to operate as a 
flexible balancing test.  Contrary to Justice Scalia’s characterization, the Mead 
majority did not attempt to ascertain whether the preponderance of evidence 
before the Court raised an inference of delegation.  Instead, Mead held tariff 
classification rulings to a higher standard.  Chevron did not apply, the majority 
held, because the Customs Service’s procedures for promulgating tariff 
classification letters did not satisfy several essential criteria.181  Unlike the 
notice-and-comment procedures in Chevron, the Customs Service’s decision-
making procedures were not conducive to open public deliberation, lacked 
precedential authority, and did not require the Superintendent’s 
contemporaneous approval.182  For each of these three independent reasons, the 
 
531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001), and Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); and so-called “major questions” that 
Congress would be unlikely to delegate to agency policymakers, see, e.g., Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law 
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)). 
176 Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 243. 
178 Id. at 245. 
179 Id. at 251. 
180 See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“Following Mead, the continuum of agency deference has been fraught with ambiguity.”); 
Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
Mead has “further obscured the already murky administrative law surrounding Chevron”). 
181 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. 
182 See id. at 231-33. 
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tariff classification rulings could not support a consensus for flexible agency 
administration.  The Supreme Court applied Mead’s delegation fiction in a 
manner that preserved the domain of Chevron’s consensus. 
C. Piercing Mead’s Delegation Fiction 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has continued to apply Chevron’s 
pragmatic consensus under the veil of Mead’s delegation fiction.  During the 
period from June 2001 – when Mead was decided – through the end of 
December 2007, the Supreme Court cited Chevron or Mead in forty-three 
cases.183  The Court explicitly applied Step Zero analysis – evaluating whether 
an agency action fell within Chevron’s domain – in fourteen of the cases.184  
While critics might quibble with the results reached in these fourteen cases, the 
Court’s explanations for granting or withholding Chevron deference therein is 
facially consistent with the consensus thesis advanced in this Article.  Another 
six cases apply Chevron or Skidmore without expressly addressing the Step 
Zero question.185  In seven cases, the Court denied Chevron deference based on 
 
183 These forty-three cases were identified through a search of the Westlaw database in 
January 2008. 
184 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350-51 (2007) 
(granting Chevron deference); Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc. v. Metrophones 
Telecomm., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2007) (granting Chevron deference based on 
congressional delegation); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 
1540-41 (2007) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation and expertise); Gonzales 
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-69 (2006) (denying Chevron deference based on lack of 
delegation and expertise); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 980-86 (2005) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation); Household 
Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238-39 (2004) (granting Chevron deference based 
on delegation); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487-88 (2004) 
(denying Chevron deference to internal guidance memoranda since it “lack[s] the force of 
law”); Wash. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 383 n.6 (2003) 
(denying Chevron deference to a Social Security Administration internal manual since it 
was not “a product[] of formal rulemaking); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 
45 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11 n.6 (2002) (denying Chevron deference to EEOC compliance 
manual due to poor agency deliberative process); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 
467, 501-02 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation and expertise); 
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on 
expertise and deliberative rationality); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 
137, 151 n.5 (2002) (denying Chevron deference based, in part, on lack of agency 
deliberation); Wis. Dep’t of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 497 (2002) 
(granting only Skidmore deference to proposed Medicaid rule despite finding both 
congressional delegation and administrative expertise). 
185 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 
(2007); Raymond B. Yates Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004); 
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-26 (2003); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 
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perceived statutory clarity at Step One without addressing Step Zero.186  The 
remaining sixteen cases are inconclusive; the Court either sidestepped Chevron 
entirely or cited Chevron or Mead without considering the scope of Chevron’s 
domain.187 
The precedential impact of Mead’s delegation fiction is probably best 
assessed by examining the fourteen cases in which the Supreme Court 
expressly addressed the scope of Chevron’s domain.  Collectively, these 
decisions strongly support the Chevron/Mead five-factor consensus: where 
agency decision-making processes arguably satisfied all five rationales at the 
core of Chevron’s consensus – delegated authority, expertise, political 
accountability, deliberative rationality, and national uniformity – the Court 
applied Chevron’s two-step formula.  On the other hand, where any one of 
these five rationales for deference was demonstrably lacking, the Court 
withheld Chevron treatment. 
To be sure, in the years following Mead the Court has steadfastly 
characterized congressional delegation as the crucial factor that distinguishes 
Chevron’s domain from Skidmore,188 and the Court appears to take seriously 
its commitment to honor Congress’s intent.  At the same time, however, the 
Court routinely reaches beyond statutory text, legislative history, and 
“traditional tools of statutory construction”189 to consider evidence of agency 
expertise, political accountability, deliberative rationality, and national 
 
(2002); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18-20 (2002); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002). 
186 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 n.26 (2007); Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006); Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2003); Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World 
Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2002); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. 534 U.S. 438, 462 
(2002); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320-21 n.45 (2001). 
187 See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2781 
n.18 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. 
Ct. 2499, 2515 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559, 
1584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 
1428 (2007); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 70 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Smith v. 
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243-47, 264-67 (2005); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 
269 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 
581, 600 (2004); Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003); Nat’l 
Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 809 (2003); Pharm. Research 
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 680-81 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Utah v. 
Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 472 (2002); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazbal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002); 
Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002); Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv. 
Plan v. Matz, 533 U.S. 925, 925 (2001). 
188 See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258. 
189 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984). 
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uniformity.  In so doing, the Court has surreptitiously breathed new life into 
Chevron’s consensus. 
1. Barnhart v. Walton 
One vivid illustration of this trend is Barnhart v. Walton,190 the Supreme 
Court’s 2002 decision upholding the Social Security Administration’s 
interpretation of the statutory definition of “disability” under the Social 
Security Act (“SSA”) as requiring that a claimant’s “inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity” last for at least twelve months.191  Preliminarily, 
the Court acknowledged that the Agency had formulated its interpretation of 
the SSA “through means less formal than ‘notice and comment rulemaking’” 
but concluded that this would not necessarily disqualify the interpretation from 
Chevron deference because, under Mead, less formal decision-making 
processes might also qualify for deference.192  After Mead, Chevron deference 
would apply when supported by a robust consensus.  The Court explained: 
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the 
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, 
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the 
Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that 
Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the 
legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.193 
Because all these overlapping rationales favored deference, the Court applied 
Chevron deference and upheld the Social Security Administration’s reasonable 
statutory interpretation.194 
2. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke 
More recently, the Supreme Court employed a similar consensus-based 
approach to Chevron Step One in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke.195  
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court considered a 
Department of Labor regulation exempting domestic workers who provide 
“companionship services” to the elderly and infirm from the Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s minimum wage and overtime wage requirements.  At the 
outset, Justice Breyer affirmed Mead’s delegation fiction by echoing 
Chevron’s insight that the “power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of 
 
190 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
191 Id. at 214 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000)). 
192 Id. at 221-22. 
193 Id. at 222 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001); 1 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 1.7, 3.3 
(3d ed. 1994)). 
194 Id. at 215. 
195 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007). 
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policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by 
Congress.”196  Observing that the Agency’s regulation addressed “an 
interstitial matter,”197 the Court concluded that Congress had “entrusted the 
agency to work out”198 the details through flexible agency administration: “[I]t 
is . . . reasonable to infer (and we do infer) that Congress intended its broad 
grant of definitional authority to the Department to include the authority to 
answer these kinds of questions.”199 
The Court’s Step Zero analysis did not rely exclusively upon this textual 
delegation analysis, however.  As in Barnhart, the Court considered a variety 
of other rationales for Chevron deference under the veil of Mead’s delegation 
fiction.  The Court stressed, for example, that “[t]he subject matter of the 
regulation in question concerns a matter in respect to which the agency is 
expert.”200  In addition, the Court observed that the Agency had adopted the 
regulation through a robust deliberative process: “The Department focused 
fully upon the matter in question.  It gave notice, it proposed regulations, it 
received public comment, and it issued final regulations in light of that 
comment.”201  Although the Court concluded by asserting that “the ultimate 
question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to 
treat an agency’s rule . . . as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency,” 
the Court emphasized that this inquiry required consideration of a variety of 
factors.202  These factors included whether “the agency focuses fully and 
directly upon the issue” as through “full notice-and-comment procedures” – 
not simply whether “the resulting rule falls within the [agency’s] statutory 
grant of authority.”203 
3. Gonzales v. Oregon 
The Court employed a similar consensus-based analysis in Gonzales v. 
Oregon204 when it rejected Attorney General John Ashcroft’s interpretive rule 
declaring physician-assisted suicide a violation of the Controlled Substances 
Act (“CSA”).205  Like Barnhart and Long Island Care, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s opinion for a six-Justice majority invoked Mead’s delegation 
fiction as the authoritative test for determining whether the Attorney General’s 
 
196 Id. at 2345 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197 Id. at 2346. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 2347. 
200 Id. at 2346. 
201 Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)). 
202 Id. at 2350. 
203 Id. 
204 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
205 Id. at 268. 
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interpretation warranted Chevron deference.206  In the majority’s view, the 
CSA’s text and structure did not support the assertion that Congress intended 
to authorize the Attorney General to declare physician-assisted suicide “outside 
‘the course of professional practice,’ and therefore a criminal violation of the 
CSA.”207  But Justice Kennedy’s Chevron analysis did not end there.  Looking 
beyond the statutory text and structure, he also took pains to address other 
factors from Chevron’s consensus that Congress might have considered 
important.  He stressed, for example, that Attorney General Ashcroft issued the 
interpretive rule “without consulting Oregon or apparently anyone outside his 
Department.”208  Therefore, the interpretive rule could not be attributed to a 
presidential directive or deliberative-democratic process.  Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy reasoned that the Attorney General’s lack of experience and expertise 
were important factors in discerning congressional delegation (or the lack 
thereof), “[b]ecause historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account 
in the first instance for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive 
lawmaking power to [an] agency.”209  The Attorney General’s relative lack of 
experience and expertise in matters of medical ethics militated “against a 
conclusion that the Attorney General ha[d] authority to make quintessentially 
medical judgments” relating to physician-assisted suicide.210  Once again, 
Mead’s delegation fiction invited the Court to address multiple comprehensive 
rationales for Chevron deference under the pretext of searching for evidence of 
congressional intent. 
4. Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer 
If the Supreme Court only invoked considerations such as agency expertise, 
deliberation, and political responsiveness as supplemental support for 
conclusions predetermined by the congressional delegation theory, it might be 
reasonable to conclude that Mead’s delegation theory controls Step Zero while 
other rationales for Chevron deference are mere window dressing.  The Court’s 
decision in Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer211 
challenges this hypothesis. 
 
206 Id. at 255-56, 259. 
207 Id. at 262-63 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 744 
(1973)). 
208 Id. at 253-54. 
209 Id. at 266-67 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 
499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991)). 
210 Id. at 267; cf. Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469-71 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Jody 
Freeman and Adrian Vermeule have argued that Gonzales and other recent Supreme Court 
decisions reflect a movement away from a political accountability model and toward a 
renewed focus on agency expertise.  See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 83, at 54.  More 
accurately, perhaps, Gonzales and other recent cases suggest that both rationales must be 
satisfied to trigger Chevron deference. 
211 534 U.S. 473 (2002). 
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At issue in Blumer was whether the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 
1988 (“MCCA”) would permit states to use an “income-first” method for 
calculating resource allowances for a person living at home after their spouse 
had been institutionalized, and thereby become eligible for Medicaid.212  Over 
the preceding decade, the Secretary of Health and Human Services had 
weighed in on the issue several times, issuing formal statements in favor of the 
income-first method.213  By 2001, the Secretary had announced a proposed rule 
that would permit states to make “the threshold choice of using either the 
income-first or [an alternative] method.”214  Wisconsin resident Irene Blumer 
challenged her state’s adoption of the “income-first” method and, indirectly, 
the Secretary’s interpretation of the MCCA, seeking expedited access to 
Medicaid funds.215 
On review, the Supreme Court held that Congress had delegated to the 
Secretary “the authority to prescribe standards relevant to the issue”216 and that 
the Secretary had exercised that authority by promulgating a proposed rule and 
subjecting the rule to public notice and comment.217  Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s majority opinion also noted parenthetically that the Secretary’s 
“‘significant expertise’ . . . in the context of ‘a complex and highly technical 
regulatory program’” would ordinarily warrant deference.218  Despite the 
evidence of delegation and expertise, however, the Court accorded the 
Secretary’s interpretation of the MCCA only “respectful consideration” under 
the Skidmore standard rather than full Chevron deference.219  Until the 
Secretary completed his deliberations, considered all submissions, and 
promulgated a definitive final rule, Chevron’s consensus would remain 
unsatisfied and Skidmore, not Chevron, would apply.  Blumer thus implicitly 
rejects the notion that either delegation of lawmaking authority or agency 
expertise alone is sufficient to trigger Chevron deference.220 
 
212 Id. at 478. 
213 Id. at 484-85 (citing Chi. Reg’l State Letter No. 22-94 from the Health Care Fin. 
Admin. (July 1994), reprinted in Petition and Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 87a, 
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952); Chi. Reg’l State Letter No. 51-93 from the Health Care 
Fin. Admin. (Dec. 1993), reprinted in Petition and Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 78a, 
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952)). 
214 Blumer, 534 U.S. at 485. 
215 Id. at 478. 
216 Id. at 496. 
217 Id. at 485 (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 46,763, 46,765 (2001)). 
218 Id. at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1995)). 
219 Id. 
220 Although Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia dissented, all nine Justices agreed 
that Skidmore, not Chevron, provided the appropriate standard of deference.  See id. at 505 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)) 
(arguing that the Secretary’s position was “devoid of any ‘power to persuade’” under 
Skidmore because the Secretary had expressed different views over time).  Blumer thus 
challenges the assumption that Chevron’s overlapping rationales are merely redundant, as 
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5. Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones 
Telecommunications, Inc. 
In other recent cases, the Supreme Court has cited Mead’s delegation fiction 
at Step Zero without expressly addressing agency expertise, presidential 
administration, deliberative process, or other leading rationales for Chevron 
deference.  It would be a mistake, however, to construe such cases as rejecting 
Chevron’s consensus-based approach in favor of a streamlined congressional 
delegation theory.  Consider, for instance, Global Crossing 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.,221 where 
the Supreme Court upheld a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934.222  In explaining the basis 
for its decision, the Court stated without elaboration that the FCC’s 
interpretation merited Chevron deference because Congress had delegated 
authority to the FCC to promulgate “regulations and orders with the force of 
law.”223  While the Court did not expressly discuss the other leading rationales 
for Chevron deference, neither did the Court give any indication that the FCC’s 
decision-making process would not satisfy these other rationales.  The Court’s 
invocation of Mead’s delegation theory in Global Crossing and other recent 
cases scarcely diminishes the continued salience of Chevron’s consensus. 
*  *  * 
If Karl Llewellyn is right that inductive reasoning – the “heaping up of 
concrete instances” – most accurately reveals the law’s meaning, then a strong 
argument can be made that Mead and its progeny counter-intuitively affirm 
Chevron’s consensus under the veil of legal fiction.224  A close reading of the 
Supreme Court’s recent cases suggests that Mead’s delegation fiction provides 
an incomplete account of the Court’s decision-making process at Chevron Step 
Zero.  A far better explanation can be found in Chevron’s consensus: the 
 
some scholars have suggested.  See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a 
Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 690 (2007) (arguing that when tensions arise between 
agency expertise and political accountability, “the executive may pursue either a 
technocratic course or a political one; on the logic of Chevron, either approach is 
permissible”).  The better reading of Chevron and Mead is that none of the overlapping 
rationales for deference is truly redundant; a single faulty thread in Chevron’s consensus 
compromises the integrity of the whole weave.  See, e.g., De La Mota v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2005). 
221 127 S. Ct. 1513 (2007). 
222 Id. at 1516 (holding that “the FCC’s application of § 201(b) [of the Communications 
Act of 1934] to the carrier’s refusal to pay compensation is a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute”). 
223 Id. at 1522 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005)). 
224 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 2 
(William S. Hein & Co. 2007) (1930). 
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Supreme Court applies Chevron in contexts where agencies formulate 
regulatory policy through robust decision-making processes that reflect 
delegated authority, expertise, political responsiveness and accountability, 
deliberative rationality, and national uniformity.  Conversely, the Supreme 
Court withholds Chevron deference in contexts where one or more of these 
rationales for deference are not satisfied.  As the Court’s Chevron-related 
decisions accumulate, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Court has 
not, in fact, embraced a strong congressional delegation theory that turns solely 
upon delegation of lawmaking authority to the exclusion of other prevailing 
rationales for Chevron deference.  Rather, the Court employs congressional 
delegation under Mead primarily as a heuristic for exploring the various core 
rationales within Chevron’s consensus.225  The Court therefore grants Chevron 
deference only in contexts where diverse political, philosophical, and 
jurisprudential traditions favor flexible agency administration. 
D. The Puzzling Resilience of Mead’s Delegation Fiction 
Assuming the foregoing analysis accurately captures the Supreme Court’s 
recent Chevron jurisprudence, why has the Court not abandoned the 
congressional delegation fiction in favor of a more transparent consensus-
based approach? 
It might be tempting to conclude the Justices actually believe they can 
discern Congress’s intent to delegate interpretive authority from circumstantial 
evidence in an agency’s enabling legislation.  This hypothesis does not 
withstand close scrutiny, however.  The Supreme Court’s leading luminaries in 
administrative law – Justices Breyer and Scalia – have confessed in separate 
law review articles that the congressional delegation theory is a legal fiction.226  
In Justice Scalia’s words, “the quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is 
probably a wild-goose chase” because in most contexts “Congress neither (1) 
intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, 
but rather (3) didn’t think about the matter at all.”227  
Notwithstanding the delegation fiction’s formal inadequacy, Justices Breyer 
and Scalia defend the congressional delegation fiction on functionalist 
grounds.  Justice Breyer asserts that the delegation fiction “has institutional 
virtues” because it constrains judicial discretion; when judges ask whether 
 
225 See H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF “AS IF” 39-42 (C.K. Ogden trans., 2d ed. 
1935) (1924) (discussing “heuristic fictions”). 
226 Breyer, supra note 73, at 370 (“[Courts] have looked to practical features of the 
particular circumstance to decide whether it ‘makes sense,’ in terms of the need for fair and 
efficient administration of that statute in light of its substantive purpose, to imply a 
congressional intent that courts defer to the agency’s interpretation.”); Scalia, supra note 
138, at 517 (“[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents merely a fiction, presumed intent, 
and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can 
legislate.”). 
227 Scalia, supra note 138, at 517. 
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Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to an agency, they commit 
themselves to scrutinizing the statute closely and providing persuasive policy 
rationales for deference to administrative agencies.228  Justice Scalia adds that 
once the Supreme Court has clarified the factors it will accept as evidence of 
delegation, Congress should be able to adjust its legislative drafting practices 
accordingly.229  By the Justices’ logic, Mead’s delegation fiction arguably 
operationalizes theories of congressional policymaking and judicial restraint.230 
The flaws in this functionalist defense of the delegation fiction should be 
readily apparent.  First, Justice Breyer’s assertion that the Court’s search for 
congressional delegation constrains judicial reasoning is debatable, to say the 
least.  Indeed, the reverse is true: as a legal fiction of indeterminate content, 
Mead liberates the Court from having to ground its application of Chevron 
deference in any objectively verifiable criteria.  Cloaking Chevron in Mead’s 
delegation fiction allows the Supreme Court to “appeas[e] the longing for an 
appearance of [methodological] conservatism,”231 while remaining free to 
define Chevron’s domain based upon undisclosed normative criteria of its own 
choosing.  Far from enhancing judicial restraint and accountability, Mead’s 
flexible delegation inquiry enhances judicial discretion and conceals judicial 
policymaking. 
Second, Justice Scalia’s assertion that the delegation fiction provides a 
clearer standard to guide future congressional action is unpersuasive.  One 
need look no further than Justice Scalia’s own dissent in Mead to appreciate 
that the congressional delegation fiction does not ipso facto ensure interpretive 
clarity.232  Experience has shown, moreover, that Mead’s delegation fiction has 
spawned confusion and discord in the circuit courts, which have failed to 
appreciate the continuing relevance of Chevron’s consensus.233  There is little 
 
228 See Breyer, supra note 73, at 371 (“Using these factors as a means of discerning a 
hypothetical congressional intent about ‘deference’ . . . allows courts to allocate the law-
interpreting function between court and agency in a way likely to work best within any 
particular statutory scheme.”). 
229 Scalia, supra note 138, at 517; see also Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron – The 
Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 824 (1990) (stating that 
Congress’s awareness of Chevron and distrust of “executive branch interpretation” should 
lead Congress to be more careful in its drafting). 
230 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 
798 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Deference]; Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: 
Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 824 (2002) 
(arguing that the congressional delegation fiction “has resuscitated the axiom that Congress 
is the primary source of authority to make law within our system of separation of powers”); 
Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1439-40 (2007). 
231 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 37 (1967). 
232 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
233 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1445-47 (identifying 
inconsistencies in circuit courts’ application of Mead and concluding that Chevron’s domain 
now hinges on whatever particular factors “the first panel to evaluate a particular 
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reason to believe that members of Congress have found the delegation fiction 
any more intelligible than the courts themselves. 
If I am correct that the Supreme Court actually employs Mead’s delegation 
fiction as a heuristic for the five core rationales in Chevron’s consensus, 
concerns about judicial activism and doctrinal indeterminacy might fade 
somewhat.  But this observation simply demonstrates the inadequacy of 
Mead’s nebulous delegation fiction as a positive theory of Chevron deference 
and underscores the need for courts to develop a more transparent framework 
for defining the scope of Chevron’s domain. 
III. RECONSTRUCTING CHEVRON’S CONSENSUS 
What you have been doing by the fiction, – could you, or could you not, have 
done it without the fiction?  If not, your fiction is a wicked lie: if yes, a 
foolish one.234 
Nearly a century ago, John Chipman Gray observed that “as a system of 
Law becomes more perfect, . . . better definitions and rules are laid down 
which enable us to dispense with the historic fictions which have been already 
created.  Such fictions are scaffolding, . . . but, after the building is erected, 
serv[e] only to obscure it.”235  Lon Fuller would later elaborate upon Gray’s 
scaffolding analogy, explaining that a legal “fiction is like a scaffolding in that 
it can be removed with ease.  The fiction seldom becomes a ‘vested interest’; it 
does not gather about it a group of partisan defenders.  No one will mourn its 
passing.”236  According to this view, legal fictions function primarily to ease 
the law’s transition toward a new regime.  Once the new edifice has been 
completed, however, the old scaffolding can be disassembled and discarded. 
In this spirit, I propose that the time is ripe to set aside Mead’s congressional 
delegation fiction and allow Chevron’s consensus to stand freely on its own 
merits.  Few would mourn Mead’s passing and the benefits flowing from an 
express consensus-based approach would be significant.  First, Chevron’s 
consensus would clarify the scope of Chevron’s domain.  Agencies would be 
free to interpret ambiguous statutes flexibly as long as they employ procedures 
reflecting rational deliberation and expertise, conducive to national uniformity, 
consistent with actual congressional authorization, and subject to the 
incumbent administration’s general guidance and accountability.  Second, 
Chevron’s pragmatic consensus would strengthen Chevron’s political stability 
by disarming legal realists’ criticisms of Mead and laying the groundwork for 
 
interpretive procedure” deigns to select); Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead 
and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1895-96 
(2006). 
234 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 283 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1843). 
235 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 35 (MacMillan Co. 
1921) (1909). 
236 FULLER, supra note 231, at 70; see also VAIHINGER, supra note 225, at 88. 
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mutual respect and reciprocity among conflicting comprehensive theories of 
the administrative state.  Third, expressly endorsing Chevron as a multifactor 
consensus would make the Supreme Court’s own decisions more transparent.  
This enhanced transparency would in turn augment the Court’s political 
accountability, aid Congress in drafting future legislation, and facilitate 
decisional uniformity in the lower federal courts. 
A. Mapping Chevron’s Consensus 
One virtue of Chevron’s consensus is that it draws a sharper distinction 
between decision-making processes that fall within Chevron’s domain and 
those beyond the pale.  Rather than rely on Mead’s controversial delegation 
fiction, a consensus-based inquiry at Step Zero would consider whether an 
agency’s decision-making process could sustain a consensus between the 
leading foundational theories for flexible agency administration.  Courts 
reviewing agency action might reasonably presume in the first instance that an 
agency’s exercise of lawmaking authority merits Chevron deference.  Where 
litigants demonstrate that an agency’s decision-making process does not satisfy 
one of Chevron’s overlapping rationales, however, the agency would not be 
entitled to Chevron deference and courts would proceed to evaluate the 
agency’s statutory construction under the residual Skidmore factors.237  This 
consensus-based, burden-shifting framework would provide a far clearer 
standard for defining Chevron’s domain than Mead’s nebulous delegation 
fiction or Skidmore’s fuzzy balancing test. 
The EPA rulemaking reviewed in Chevron represents one obvious locus of 
consensus.  However, agency statutory interpretations need not be adopted 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to qualify for Chevron 
deference.  Under certain circumstances, a variety of agency policymaking 
procedures could satisfy Chevron’s consensus, as courts have recognized under 
Mead.238  For example, formal adjudications satisfy the cumulative criteria for 
flexible agency administration under Chevron’s consensus.239  In INS v. 
Aguirre-Aguirre,240 the Supreme Court granted Chevron deference to a Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision interpreting the statutory language 
 
237 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
238 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 513 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)) (“Congressional delegation to an 
administrative agency . . . may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to 
engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rule-making, or by some other indication of a 
comparable congressional intent.”). 
239 See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987)); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine 
Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-19 (1992); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988)); see also Croley, supra note 163, at 106-
07 (discussing Chevron’s applicability to formal adjudications). 
240 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
  
2008] CHEVRON’S CONSENSUS 1317 
 
“serious nonpolitical crime” under the Immigration and Nationality Act.241  
The Court observed that Congress had expressly charged the Attorney General 
“with the administration and enforcement” of the Act and specified that the 
“determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions 
of law shall be controlling.”242  The Attorney General, in turn, had “vested the 
BIA with power to exercise the discretion and authority conferred upon the 
Attorney General by law in the course of considering and determining cases 
before it.”243  Having established congressional delegation to its satisfaction, 
the Court proceeded to look beyond the delegation inquiry to other rationales 
within Chevron’s consensus.  The Court noted, for instance, that the BIA’s 
expertise and responsiveness to presidential agenda-setting weighed strongly in 
favor of Chevron deference – particularly given that the BIA’s adjudicatory 
role entailed “sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign 
relations.”244  Thus, insofar as the BIA sought to give “ambiguous statutory 
terms concrete meaning through [the deliberative, precedential] process of 
case-by-case adjudication,” the Supreme Court reasoned that the BIA’s 
statutory interpretations “should be accorded Chevron deference.”245  Aguirre-
Aguirre thus underscores the continued relevance of Chevron’s consensus in 
formal adjudication as a guide to the scope of Chevron’s domain. 
Conversely, Chevron’s consensus counsels against deference to statutory 
interpretations developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
agency adjudication in the absence of congressional delegation, expertise, 
uniformity, or political accountability.  By definition, formal agency 
adjudication provides procedural safeguards that facilitate public participation 
and agency deliberation;246 an agency’s failure to employ these mandatory 
procedures would rule out Chevron’s deference.  Administrative law judges 
who lack policymaking authority would not receive deference under 
 
241 Id. at 418 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994), amended by Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 307, 110 Stat. 
3009-612 (1996)). 
242 Id. at 424 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (Supp. III 1994) (current version at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a)(1) (2000))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
243 Id. at 425 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998) (current version at 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(i) (2008))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
244 Id. (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  But see Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1671, 1682 (2007) (discussing circuit courts’ reluctance to grant Chevron deference 
to the BIA’s interpretations of law based on skepticism about the BIA’s expertise). 
245 Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
448-49 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
246 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(b), 555(b), 556(d), 557(c) (2000) (mandating that, under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), agencies must provide notice to persons potentially 
affected by the agency’s action, allow for the presentation of evidence in oral or 
documentary form, permit cross-examination by participating parties, and base findings and 
conclusions of fact exclusively on record evidence). 
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Chevron.247  Similarly, the consensus approach would withhold Chevron 
deference from informal agency adjudications and rulemakings that 
systematically neglect expert evidence248 or impede the establishment of a 
unitary national standard.249  On the rulemaking side, the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirements for informal rulemaking would be insufficient to justify 
flexible agency administration where agencies lack a reasonable claim to 
expertise or their chosen interpretation would not provide a uniform national 
standard.  Thus, Chevron’s consensus challenges the popular misconception 
that all agency statutory constructions adopted through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking merit Chevron deference.250  
The consensus approach also provides a useful framework for clarifying 
Chevron’s application to other forms of agency policymaking.  For example, 
the U.S. Commerce Department’s antidumping determinations, which do not 
fall neatly into either the rulemaking or adjudication paradigms, could qualify 
for Chevron deference based on either expertise or political accountability – 
but only where the agency voluntarily engages in an open deliberative process 
 
247 Examples include administrative law judges within the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission (“FMSHRC”) and the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission (“OSHRC”).  See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991) (holding 
that the OSHRC was not entitled to deference because Congress had committed 
policymaking authority to another agency body, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration). 
248 See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (denying 
Chevron deference to the Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the 
Rehabilitation Act, a statute of general applicability, because the agency lacked expertise). 
249 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-80, 482 (1999) (denying 
Chevron deference where the statute was administered by multiple federal agencies).  But 
see Individual Reference Servs. Group v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(granting Chevron deference where agencies authored a coordinated interpretation of an 
ambiguous statutory term).  Some circuits have elevated the uniformity inquiry by framing 
Chevron as an inquiry into whether the agency interpretation would have decisive 
precedential value within the agency.  See, e.g., Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 
1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzalez, 449 F.3d 915, 922 
(9th Cir. 2006)).  Even these courts have recognized, however, that precedential uniformity 
is insufficient for Chevron deference unless other factors are satisfied, such as the 
administrator’s “imprimatur” of authority.  Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 922 (citing 8 
C.F.R. § 100.3(d)(1) (2006)) (describing an immigration judge’s decision as “without 
precedential value and without the imprimatur of the Attorney General or the Attorney 
General’s delegate”); see also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001). 
250 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 227 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“The SSA’s recently enacted regulations emerged from 
notice-and-comment rulemaking and merit deference.  No more need be said.”); Groff v. 
United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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that results in a precedential standard.251  Similar standards could apply to 
agency interpretive rules, giving structure to Mead’s vague admonition that, 
although interpretive rules “enjoy no Chevron status as a class,” some 
interpretive rules might yet fall within Chevron’s domain.252  Even agency 
“interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines” – traditionally “beyond the Chevron pale”253 – might 
sometimes warrant Chevron deference if they emerge from a robust decision-
making process that achieves precedential authority within the agency.254  In 
these contexts and many others, Chevron’s multifactor consensus would set the 
Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence on a more coherent and intelligible 
foundation. 
As for recent scholarly efforts to extend Chevron deference to new fields 
such as criminal law and foreign relations law,255 Chevron’s pluralist 
consensus sounds a cautionary note.  Although the executive branch’s superior 
expertise furnishes an important functional justification for judicial deference 
in these fields, the Chevron analogy loses force as consideration shifts to other 
factors in Chevron’s pluralist consensus such as congressional delegation, 
deliberative rationality, or regulatory uniformity.  For example, it would be a 
mistake to apply Chevron-style deference to the State Department’s 
interpretation of multilateral treaties and customary norms, because this 
approach would undermine one of Chevron’s core rationales – regulatory 
uniformity – by inviting conflict between domestic law and international 
consensus.256  The case for applying Chevron deference to federal criminal law 
is similarly flawed.  Even those who advocate applying Chevron deference in 
 
251 See, e.g., Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1379-82 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting Chevron deference to a Commerce Department antidumping 
determination). 
252 Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 (citing Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1463, 1472-73 (1992)).  Compare Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great 
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (granting deference to an interpretive rule issued by the 
Secretary of the Interior), with Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (1991) (stating that “interpretive 
rules” are not entitled to the same level of “deference as norms that derive from the exercise 
of . . . delegated lawmaking powers” (citations omitted)). 
253 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
254 See id. at 230; cf. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (“Of course we deny 
deference ‘to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, 
or administrative practice.’  The deliberateness of such positions, if not indeed their 
authoritativeness, is suspect.” (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
212 (1988))). 
255 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
256 Criddle, supra note 25, at 1930-33; see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note 25, at 1248-
49 (arguing that courts cannot reasonably infer a delegation of interpretive authority to the 
executive branch in contexts where treaties or customary norms operate as constraints upon 
executive authority). 
  
1320 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1271 
 
criminal law recognize that Congress has delegated interpretive authority over 
federal criminal law to the courts, not the executive branch.257  Moreover, the 
Justice Department’s interpretations of criminal statutes generally arise as ad 
hoc litigation positions, which do not necessarily reflect the robust deliberation 
or national uniformity required for Chevron deference.  To honor Chevron’s 
spirit, federal courts should resist appeals to extend Chevron-style deference 
literally or by analogy to these and other contexts that fall outside the scope of 
Chevron’s multifactor consensus. 
Chevron’s consensus thus illuminates the borders of Chevron’s domain.  
Where all of Chevron’s five core rationales are satisfied, federal courts should 
defer to agencies’ flexible interpretations of ambiguous statutes.  Conversely, 
where any of these core rationales remains unsatisfied, courts should determine 
instead whether the agency’s preferred interpretation is otherwise persuasive 
under Skidmore’s residual balancing test.  Reconstructing Chevron’s consensus 
in this manner would provide a more coherent guide to Chevron’s domain than 
Mead’s nebulous delegation fiction. 
B. Chevron Deference, Legal Pluralism, and Political Stability 
A second virtue of the consensus approach is that it offers a politically stable 
foundation for Chevron deference.  At a time when no single comprehensive 
theory of the administrative state has gained universal approval and diverse 
theories of statutory interpretation abound, a pragmatic consensus-based 
approach fosters greater harmony in Chevron jurisprudence.  Whether a judge 
approaches problems in administrative law from the perspective of pluralist or 
civic republican theory, inherent executive authority or deliberative 
democracy, agency independence or political accountability, Chevron’s 
consensus offers a serviceable framework for addressing the judge’s core 
jurisprudential commitments while according reciprocity to other judges with 
different views. 
To be sure, reasonable judges might continue to disagree as to whether 
agency expertise, political accountability, congressional delegation, or some 
other factor provides the best theoretical grounding for Chevron deference.  
From time to time, cases will fall outside the scope of Chevron’s consensus, 
triggering actual conflicts between its competing rationales.  In such cases, 
courts should pass over Chevron deference and apply the residual Skidmore 
test to determine whether agency interpretations merit deference in the face of 
persistent theoretical friction.  Statutory interpretations adopted through 
Skidmore’s balancing test would not qualify for flexible agency administration 
– Chevron’s exclusive domain – but would instead be subject to traditional 
principles of stare decisis.  This approach would enhance the political stability 
 
257 Kahan, supra note 24, at 474 (explaining that Congress allows for ambiguity in 
federal criminal statutes and is “perfectly aware that this approach [shifts] a great deal of 
law-defining authority to courts”). 
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of Chevron Step Zero in the face of enduring theoretical pluralism and draw a 
more coherent distinction between Chevron and Skidmore. 
Chevron’s antifoundationalist consensus will not appeal to everyone.  Some 
might agree with Ronald Dworkin that the Supreme Court should pursue a 
unitary theory that would lend greater coherence to the interrelationship 
between courts and agencies in statutory interpretation.258  Significant practical 
obstacles impede Dworkin’s quest for coherence, however.  At present, no 
single rationale for Chevron deference can provide a politically stable 
foundation for flexible agency administration because none has achieved 
anything close to a consensus among judges and scholars.  Nor do any of the 
prevailing rationales appear likely to emerge victorious from the current scrum.  
Thus, the Dworkinian yearning for a comprehensive theory of court-agency 
relations, admirable though it may be, does not at present furnish a viable 
alternative to Chevron’s consensus.  Until a usable comprehensive theory takes 
shape, the consensus-based approach best satisfies the pragmatic imperative 
for a second-best solution to stabilize Chevron’s domain amidst enduring 
theoretical pluralism. 
C. Demystifying Chevron’s Domain 
Piercing Mead’s delegation fiction would also demystify the Supreme 
Court’s decision-making process at Chevron Step Zero for the benefit of 
Congress, agencies, and the lower federal courts.  For the past seven years, 
Mead’s delegation fiction has cast a shadow of uncertainty over Chevron’s 
domain, perplexing courts and commentators alike.  To address this problem, 
the Supreme Court should acknowledge Mead’s delegation theory for what it is 
– a legal fiction – and candidly invoke Chevron’s five-factor consensus as the 
definitive test for Chevron deference.259 
Judicial candor has many advocates, of course.  David Shapiro has 
emphasized that courts’ duty to provide reasoned explanations for their 
decisions – “grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended – 
serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power.”260  
 
258 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 265 (1986).  For example, judges and scholars 
who defend Chevron as an extension of the President’s constitutional powers would likely 
oppose a consensus-based approach to Chevron deference. 
259 Professor Bressman has argued in a similar vein that courts should “simply . . . 
acknowledge that Chevron is based on a fiction about congressional intent in the service of 
broader democratic values.”  Bressman, Deference, supra note 230, at 765. 
260 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) 
(footnote omitted).  But see Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive 
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1979) (arguing that the 
law’s legitimacy depends more on perception than reality and that a judicial system’s 
“paramount” objective may be simply to provide an “authoritative resolution” to disputes). 
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The argument for judicial candor “carries special force” for judges “in a 
constitutional democracy,”261 observes Peter Smith: 
Specifically, because a requirement of candor makes transparent a judge’s 
reasons, it also makes transparent his choices.  Sometimes those choices 
will be factually contingent, and sometimes they will be purely 
normative.  When the choices are factually contingent, the public – lay 
people, political officials in other branches, and scholars – can measure 
the descriptive validity of the factual claims.  And, more important, when 
the choices are normative, candor enables the public to assess both the 
appropriateness in general of judges’ making such choices and the 
desirability of the particular normative choice at issue in the case.262 
Judicial candor also serves the interests of justice by illuminating the law’s 
application for those who are themselves subject to it.263 
Mead’s delegation fiction does not rest easily with the constitutional 
imperative of judicial candor.  To be sure, Justices Scalia and Breyer might be 
right that courts could employ Mead’s delegation fiction to operationalize a 
theory of judicial restraint.264  But to the extent courts actually deploy Mead’s 
delegation inquiry without acknowledging its fictional character, the fog of 
fiction can also obscure judicial self-deception and subterfuge.  This threat is 
arguably heightened in the Chevron context where courts lack empirically 
verifiable evidence of actual congressional intent.  Because courts must infer 
congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority from ambiguous 
evidence, they can easily manipulate the delegation fiction to grant or deny 
Chevron deference based solely on how they wish to decide particular cases.265  
Moreover, whether or not courts employ legal fictions generally as a “cover for 
rascality,”266 as Bentham memorably quipped, the fact remains that Mead’s 
delegation fiction tends to undermine judicial candor in practice by cloaking 
the deeper normative judgments that sustain Chevron’s consensus.  Therefore, 
advocates of judicial candor are likely to greet Mead’s delegation fiction with 
suspicion. 
 
261 Smith, supra note 230, at 1482. 
262 Id. at 1482-83. 
263 See Diver, supra note 74, at 575 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-65 
(2d ed. 1969)) (“As Lon Fuller has argued, the ‘internal morality’ of law requires that it be 
comprehensible to those whose conduct it regulates.”). 
264 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
265 See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 825-27. 
266 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on 
Government, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 511 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart 
eds., The Athlone Press 1977) (1838); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, LETTERS ON SCOTCH 
REFORM (1808), reprinted in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3, 13 (John Bowring ed., 
1962) (“Fiction [in law is] a willful falsehood, uttered by a judge, for the purpose of giving 
to injustice the colour of justice.”). 
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In contrast, the Supreme Court could enhance the transparency of its 
deference jurisprudence by employing Chevron’s consensus.  Under the 
consensus-based approach, the Court would engage in a more robust form of 
public reasoning, explaining in concrete terms why an agency’s decision-
making process satisfies or does not satisfy each of the rationales for flexible 
agency administration.  Where any of the leading rationales for deference 
remains unsatisfied, the Skidmore test would similarly require the Court to 
address each of the rationales for deference and explain why certain factors 
should overcome others in deciding whether deference is appropriate to the 
statutory interpretation under review.  The consensus framework thus 
transforms the controversial Chevron/Skidmore distinction into a useful device 
for promoting judicial candor and opening judicial reasoning to public 
scrutiny, holding judges accountable for their deference determinations. 
By making the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence more accessible and 
intelligible, the consensus-based approach would also foster decisional 
uniformity in the circuit courts.  Federal courts would no longer have to parse 
the tea leaves of Supreme Court decisions such as Mead and Barnhart to 
determine which comprehensive rationale for Chevron deference is currently in 
vogue.  Chevron’s consensus would thus lay the foundation for a more uniform 
Chevron jurisprudence throughout the federal system. 
D. Legal Fictions All the Way Down 
Although Chevron’s consensus has many functional advantages over 
Mead’s congressional delegation fiction, it is not a panacea for the legal 
fictions that pervade Chevron jurisprudence.  The ubiquity of legal fictions in 
statutory interpretation generally, and in Chevron jurisprudence specifically, is 
reminiscent of the classic tale recounted by Justice Scalia in Rapanos v. United 
States:267 
[A]n Eastern guru affirms that the earth is supported on the back of a 
tiger.  When asked what supports the tiger, he says it stands upon an 
elephant; and when asked what supports the elephant he says it is a giant 
turtle.  When asked, finally, what supports the giant turtle, he is briefly 
taken aback, but quickly replies “Ah, after that it is turtles all the way 
down.”268 
The more closely one scrutinizes the various rationales for Chevron 
deference, the clearer it becomes that Chevron’s revolution, like the guru’s 
earth, rests on legal fictions “all the way down.”  Chevron’s various 
 
267 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
268 Id. at 754 n.14 (paraphrasing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 
28-29 (1973)).  In Chevron itself, Justice Stevens cited Roscoe Pound’s assertion that the 
very concept of “interpretation” could be characterized as a “general fiction” insofar as it 
obscures a court’s prescriptive function.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.10 (1984) (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON 
LAW 174-75 (1921)). 
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comprehensive rationales are each legal fictions to the extent they depend upon 
contextually contingent factual assumptions.269  Indeed, the very concept of a 
consensus in Chevron jurisprudence might be characterized as a legal fiction.  
Although Chevron achieved unanimity within the Supreme Court, flexible 
agency administration has not achieved unanimous approval within the legal 
academy.270  Moreover, the search for zones of consensus in Chevron 
jurisprudence has a fictional quality given the proliferation of rationales for 
Chevron deference.  As a matter of practical necessity, courts have no choice 
but to confine their inquiry at Step Zero to a limited set of factors, such as the 
five core rationales discussed in Chevron, Mead, and Barnhart.  For these 
reasons alone, Chevron’s consensus arguably falls short of a genuine 
consensus and remains firmly entrenched in legal fictions. 
Nevertheless, the idea that Chevron’s consensus rests on legal fictions 
should not be viewed as cause for alarm.  As Eben Moglen and Richard Pierce 
have stressed, Chevron is hardly unique in its reliance on legal fictions; “all 
interpretive regimes are built on a series of [legal] fictions.”271  Moreover, even 
assuming courts could purge Chevron jurisprudence of its legal fictions, it is 
not self-evident that this course of action would be desirable.  “If all fictions 
were eliminated,” R.A. Samek cautions, “we would be saddled with the dead 
fictions of yesterday. . . .  To engage in a witch-hunt for fictions is to entrench 
the doctrine of the day.”272 
Rather than attempt to eradicate all legal fictions from Chevron 
jurisprudence, courts should focus their energies on selecting interpretive 
principles that foster political stability and advance rule-of-law values, while 
candidly acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of their chosen fictions.  
Chevron’s consensus substantially advances these objectives.  By employing 
Chevron’s two-step test exclusively in contexts where all of the leading 
rationales counsel deference, the Supreme Court could clarify Chevron’s 
domain, broaden its appeal, and bolster its political stability.  At the same time, 
the consensus-based approach would provide the flexibility needed to allow 
Chevron’s domain to evolve over time in response to new theoretical 
perspectives and institutional arrangements.  As today’s leading theories for 
Chevron deference wax and wane and other theories arise to take their place, 
 
269 See Moglen & Pierce, supra note 162, at 1210, 1213-15; Smith, supra note 230, at 
1470 (characterizing as “new legal fictions” the utilization of over-inclusive socio-political 
factual presumptions to obscure contestable normative judgments). 
270 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 144, at 456; Tyler, supra note 57, at 1430. 
271 Moglen & Pierce, supra note 162, at 1213; see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND 167 (Tudor Publ’g Co. 1936) (1930) (“[J]udges have failed to see . . . that, in 
a sense, all legal rules, principles, precepts, concepts, standards – all generalized 
statements of law – are fictions.”); FULLER, supra note 231, at 2.  But see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1990) (arguing that legal fictions 
“are not indispensable” but are rather “obstacles to thought” and should be replaced with 
“interpretive principles – ones that can be defended in substantive or institutional terms”). 
272 R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290, 313, 315 (1981). 
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the consensus would reposition the borders of Chevron’s domain to reflect 
these developments.  Properly applied, therefore, Chevron’s consensus would 
lend clarity, stability, and transparency to Chevron’s domain while satisfying 
the needs of a dynamic, pluralist society over time. 
CONCLUSION 
If Chevron has taken a seat alongside Marbury and Brown in the pantheon 
of American public law, the decision’s pluralist vision sets it apart as a 
distinctly postmodern super-precedent.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
Justice Stevens’s unanimous Chevron opinion does not embrace any single 
rationale for deference to agency statutory interpretation.  Instead, Chevron 
clears a space for flexible agency administration at the intersection between 
several leading rationales for deference: congressional delegation, 
administrative expertise, agency political responsiveness and accountability, 
deliberative rationality, and national uniformity. 
In Mead, the Supreme Court appeared to abandon Chevron’s pragmatic 
consensus by endorsing congressional delegation as the touchstone for 
Chevron deference.  By all accounts, Mead has sown confusion and discord in 
the circuit courts.  What Mead’s critics have failed to appreciate, however, is 
that the Supreme Court actually employs the congressional delegation theory 
instrumentally to sustain Chevron’s consensus.  Where agency decision-
making processes satisfy all of the leading rationales for deference, the Court 
applies Chevron.  Conversely, where any of the leading rationales for 
deference remains unsatisfied, the Court evaluates agency statutory 
interpretations under the residual Skidmore test. 
The time has come to dismantle Mead’s delegation fiction and expressly 
reconstruct Chevron’s consensus.  In future cases, the Supreme Court should 
acknowledge candidly that Chevron’s consensus governs the scope of 
Chevron’s application.  Affirming Chevron’s consensus in this manner would 
clarify Chevron’s scope, bolster Chevron’s political stability, and promote 
judicial accountability in federal statutory interpretation. 
 
